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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The fundamental question presented by this case is whether 
the State and/or its employees are to be held liable for the 
independent criminal acts of a person because that person was 
or at one time had been under the dominion of the State's 
criminal justice and corrections system. The issues on appeal 
are whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of respondent State of Utah, and whether the lower 
court erred in denying summary judgment to the individual state 
employees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action for damages for personal injury suffered 
by the plaintiff when she was shot by the defendant Kenneth 
Roberts. Plaintiff also sued the State and several of its 
individual employees alleging negligence in deciding to parole 
Roberts and to release him to a halfway house. 
The District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the 
State of Utah, and in favor of William Milliken, as Director of 
the Utah State Division of Corrections, Leon Hatch, as Deputy 
Warden of the Utah State Prison, and Weldon Morgan, as Director 
of the Ogden Community Corrections Center, in their representa-
tive capacities. Appellant appeals that judgment as of right. 
The lower court, however, denied Summary Judgment for 
Milliken, Hatch and Morgan in their individual or personal 
capacities, and this Court granted their petition for inter-
locutory appeal. The lower court also granted Summary Judgment 
in favor of Milliken, Hatch and Morgan on the issue of simple 
negligence, holding that they could only be liable for "gross 
negligence," and this Court granted appellant's petition for 
interlocutory appeal on that issue. 
All appeals, whether of right or interlocutory, were 
consolidated, and for the purpose of the consolidated appeals, 
plaintiff below will appear as appellant and the State defen-
dants as respondents. Andrew Gallegos, named below individ-
ually and as the Director of the Department of Social Services, 
was dismissed and that dismissal is not challenged. Kenneth 
Roberts and his wife, Felicia, were not concerned with the 
summary judgment motions below and are not parties to this 
appeal. 
B. Facts of the Case. 
On December 22, 1982, Kenneth Roberts ("Roberts") was 
transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community 
Correction Center, a halfway house. This transfer was to pre-
pare him for an August 9, 1983 parole date which had previously 
been granted by the Board of Pardons. In the early morning 
hours of December 24, 1982, while apparently under the influ-
ence of drugs, Roberts shot the appellant. 
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Organizational Structure of Utah Corrections System1 
1. The Governor of Utah administers the state corrections 
system through the Department of Social Services, whose Direc-
tor in 1982 was Andrew Gallegos. The Department oversaw the 
Division of Corrections, whose Director in 1982 was respondent 
William Milliken. The Division operated a number of facilities 
and organizations including the State Prison, the halfway 
houses, and Adult Probation and Parole. 
2. The prison was operated under the direction of the 
Warden, Kenneth Shulsen, who was statutorily empowered with the 
ultimate authority and responsibility for the housing of 
inmates. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-13-10 and 11 (1977). Warden 
Shulsen directly delegated the responsibility for decisions 
affecting prisoner classification to the Associate (or Deputy) 
Warden, respondent Leon Hatch.2 (Deposition of Kenneth 
Shulsen, at 6 and 9). 
A chart illustrating the organization of the Utah 
corrections system as it existed in December 1982 is 
attached hereto as Appendix "A," and is also found in 
Record on Appeal at 271. The corrections system has 
undergone some reorganization since that time. The facts 
set forth herein describe the system as it existed in 1982. 
The decision to release inmates from the corrections 
system is made by the State Board of Pardons, which is a 
separate entity from the Division of Corrections and 
answers only to the Board of Corrections and the Gov-
ernor. The Board of Pardons has virtually unrestricted 
discretion in determining how long an inmate will stay in 
prison and in setting parole dates. 
-3-
3, The men's facility at the prison is divided into min-
imum, medium and maximum security cell blocks. Within medium 
security is a block of cells known as "protective custody," 
which houses inmates who, for whatever reason, need protection 
from the general inmate population. 
4. Each prisoner at each level of confinement is reviewed 
and classified, or rated, for advancement within the system; 
good behavior brings greater freedom, responsibility and bene-
fits. Initial recommendations for inmate classifications were 
made by the inmate's Unit Management Team (UMT), which met 
weekly to review inmates. The UMT was comprised of the Cell 
Block Captain, lieutenants, case workers and psychologist, all 
of whom worked daily with the prisoners. (Id. at 12-13; Depo-
sition of Laddie Pruett, at 4). These classification recom-
mendations were then referred to the prison's Administrative 
Review Board (A.R. Board), previously called the Executive 
Classification Committee. The Chairman of the A.R. Board was 
respondent Leon Hatch, the Associate Warden, who was respon-
sible for the administration of inmate classification. Other 
voting members of the A.R. Board included Eldon Barnes, Direc-
tor of Prison Security; Richard Barnhart, Sr., Director of 
Medium Security; and Fred Hurst, Director of Minimum Security. 
Other members of the prison staff were invited to attend A.R. 
Board meetings and give input regarding prisoners. The staff 
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members were sometimes asked to join in the vote and to give 
the Associate Warden additional input in deciding difficult 
classification cases. (Deposition of Leon Hatch, at 15-16; 
Deposition of Kenneth Shulsen, supra). 
5. Once an inmate was given a parole date by the Board of 
Pardons, he could be re-classified and transferred to a Commu-
nity Corrections Center (halfway house). The Community Correc-
tions Centers Administration, a subdivision of the Division of 
Corrections separate from the State Prison, and its Director 
Robert Anderson, were responsible for the five Centers in the 
state. Respondent Weldon Morgan was director of the Ogden 
Center. (Deposition of Robert Anderson, at 43-44). 
6. Prior to 1982, the five individual Center Directors 
worked directly with the prison staff, including Unit Manage-
ment Teams, in making recommendations to the A.R. Board for the 
transfer of those prisoners who had received parole dates. 
This method, however, sometimes resulted in disputes between 
Directors when the same prisoner was "approved" by more than 
one Director for transfer to more than one facility and encour-
aged maneuvering by directors in attempts to obtain the best 
inmates for their facility. (Deposition of John Powers, at 
39-41). 
7. Thus, in mid-1982, John Powers, a veteran Corrections 
employee, was appointed by Robert Anderson to develop a new 
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method of screening prisoners for transfer to the Centers. 
Powers became Chairman of the Community Corrections Centers 
Screening Committee, with an office at the prison, and he was 
to be the liaison between the Centers and the Prison A.R. 
Board. The Committee consisted of representatives from each of 
the five Centers and the Committee was to meet regularly to 
consider candidates for transfer to the halfway houses. (Id. 
at 8-10 and 38). 
8. The Community Corrections Centers Administration main-
tained an appropriate consistency of operations throughout the 
various Centers, yet permitted the individual Directors lati-
tude within their professional judgment and discretion to deal 
with the problems of their particular situation and residents. 
Each of the Centers had its own policies and procedures manual. 
(Id. at 33-34) . 
Kenneth Glen Roberts 
9. Roberts was born in Payson, Utah, in 1950. He came 
from a broken home and spent his adolescent years in and out of 
the State Industrial School. (Utah State Board of Pardons File 
on Kenneth Roberts, Presentence Report, Nov. 20, 1967, Record 
on Appeal, at 272-76). 
10. In 1967, Roberts, then 17, and two companions broke 
into an apartment, raped a woman, and stole her jewelry and 
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car. Roberts was certified to stand trial as an adult, pled 
guilty, and was sentenced to ten years to life. (Id.). 
11. Roberts was paroled from prison in March 1973, after 
serving five years. His parole was later revoked after he was 
arrested and convicted for an armed robbery in May 1973. He 
received an indeterminate sentence for that offense of five 
years to life. After serving five years, he was paroled in 
December 1978. Nine months later he pled guilty to burglary 
and rape, and was given a one to fifteen year sentence for each 
offense. (Utah State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous 
Documents I, Record on Appeal, at 278-82). 
12. During his second term at the prison, Roberts testi-
fied against another inmate who was charged with a murder at 
the prison. Thereafter, Roberts was placed on protective 
custody and remained there until his transfer to the Ogden 
Community Corrections Center in December 1982. (Kenneth 
Roberts Prison Jacket, C-Notes file, June 5, 1975 entry, Record 
on Appeal, at 283-84). 
13. Roberts underwent a psychiatric evaluation at the Utah 
State Hospital in Provo, Utah, from December 1979 to February 
1980. Tests performed at that time showed that Roberts had an 
I.Q. of 126 and was "of superior intelligence, having the abil-
ity to do college level work and . . . beyond." Roberts had 
completed high school and several semesters of college credit 
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while incarcerated in the state prison. On February 9, 1980, 
Roberts ran away from the State Hospital, but was apprehended 
almost immediately and transferred back to prison. (Utah State 
Hospital File on Kenneth Roberts, Psychological Assessment, 
Jan. 15, 1980, Record on Appeal, at 285-89; Utah State Board of 
Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents II, Record on Appeal, at 
290-95) . 
14. Felicia Santos Roberts is a New York native who grad-
uated from Brigham Young University with a degree in applied 
sociology. Following graduation, she accepted employment at 
the Utah State Hospital as a psychiatric aide, and met Roberts 
there while he was undergoing psychiatric evaluation. After 
Roberts returned to prison, they corresponded daily, and ulti-
mately were married in September 1980. They were divorced in 
1983. (Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 2-8). 
Roberts' Transfer to Ogden Center 
15. Felicia Roberts first contacted Gary Webster, the 
Executive Secretary of the Board of Pardons, almost nine months 
prior to her September 1980 marriage to Kenneth Roberts. (Utah 
State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents II, 
supra.) Both she and Roberts lobbied Webster and the members 
of Roberts' Unit Management Team at the prison, telling them of 
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the changes Roberts was making in his attitude and behavior, in 
an effort to have Roberts' parole rehearing date moved up. 
(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 30 and 40) Laddie Pruett, 
Roberts' case worker, also noted positive changes in Roberts' 
behavior and attitude and wrote a favorable report to the 
Board of Pardons. At a redetermination hearing in March 1982, 
the Board moved Roberts' rehearing date up to August 1982. 
(Utah State Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous Documents III, 
Record on Appeal, at 296-312). 
16. The Board of Pardons met to consider Roberts for 
parole on August 18, 1982. (Id.). Roberts was serving time 
for his third felony conviction, as were nearly 65% of the 
other prison inmates. Roberts had served nearly 66 months on 
his first felony (rape), over 60 months on his second felony 
(robbery), and would have served 36 months on his third convic-
tion (burglary and rape).3 (Id.; Affidavit of Christine 
Nearly half of the inmates were serving time on at 
least their fourth conviction and more than one third had 
five or more felony convictions. Division of Corrections 
statistics also show that from October 1982 to October 
1984, inmates released from the Utah State Prison had 
served, on average, less than 32 months for rape, less than 
36 months for robbery, and less than 25 months for 
burglary. See Utah State Corrections Annual Report, infra, 
at p. 66, Record on Appeal, at 352. Thus, prior to 
Roberts' transfer to the Ogden Community Corrections Center 
on December 22, 1982, Kenneth Roberts was a statistically 
average inmate who had served his time. 
-9-
Mitchell, Ph.D., and accompanying Utah State Corrections Annual 
Report 1984, Record on Appeal, at 313-355). 
17. The staffs of both the prison and the Board of Pardons 
had recommended an August, 1984 parole date. However, the 
Board of Pardons, apparently impressed by Roberts' record of 
improvement, his demeanor at the hearing, and the appearance 
and support of his wife, set an earlier parole date of 
August 9, 1983. (Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous 
Documents IV, Record on Appeal, at 356-368). 
18. After the Board set the new parole date, Felicia 
Roberts contacted Weldon Morgan at the Ogden Halfway House. 
She told him of Roberts1 parole date and asked about the possi-
bility of Roberts being accepted at Morgan's facility. Morgan 
had known Roberts at the State Industrial School and told 
Felicia that if Roberts had not changed from his days at the 
State School, he would be reluctant to accept Roberts at the 
Center. (Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 40-41; Deposition of 
Weldon Morgan, at 19). 
19. On August 31, 1982, the Community Corrections Centers 
Screening Committee considered, and denied, Roberts1 request 
for transfer to the Ogden Center. Roberts had a pending 
disciplinary action arising from an altercation at the prison 
which made him ineligible for transfer, and some committee 
members were not convinced Roberts was an acceptable candi-
date. (Deposition of John Powers, at 9). 
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20. The pending disciplinary action against Roberts was 
later dropped when he was found not at fault in the alterca-
tion. In early October 1982, Roberts' Unit Management Team 
recommended to the A.R. Board that Roberts be transferred to 
the Ogden Center. The team members felt that Roberts had 
indeed changed his attitude and behavior since his marriage to 
Felicia. He had earned the highest classification level for 
protective custody, served as both the unit clerk and school 
teacher (for high school equivalency courses), and counseled 
other prisoners in a program he helped design to get them off 
of protective custody and back into the prison community. He 
also became involved in voluntary group therapy. The psycho-
logical evaluations performed on Roberts by the Unit psycho-
logist, Merril Lee Rasmussen, and her contacts with him through 
group therapy, convinced her that Roberts was sincere, that he 
had made significant positive changes, and that he was deter-
mined to succeed on the outside. The members of Roberts' UMT 
felt that his chances would be improved if he had the advantage 
of living in a halfway house environment prior to parole 
release, which was less than a year away. Felicia Roberts' 
presence and employment in Ogden, as well as her support for 
Roberts and her persistent lobbying on his behalf, were also 
viewed as favorable factors by the UMT. (Kenneth Roberts 
Prison Jacket, C-Notes file, supra; Deposition of Merril Lee 
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Rasmussen, at 66-69; Deposition of Laddie Pruett, at 10-13; 
Deposition of Bruce Daniels, at 39-40). 
21. However, at its weekly meeting on October 8, 1982, the 
A.R. Board denied the UMT's recommendation for transfer. 
Roberts and Felicia were both upset by the A.R. Board's deci-
sion. Felicia phoned William Milliken, Director of Correc-
tions, and complained that Leon Hatch, the Associate Warden, 
was prejudiced against her husband and was not giving him fair 
treatment. (Kenneth Roberts Prison Jacket, Miscellaneous File, 
Administrative Review, Oct. 8, 1982, Record on Appeal, at 
369-71; Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 22-25; Deposition of 
Bruce Daniels, at 38). 
22. Milliken called Hatch to follow-up on Felicia Roberts' 
accusation, as he did with many inquiries he received about 
inmates. Milliken did not ask Hatch to do anything particular 
for Roberts; he called simply to get information about Roberts' 
status so that he could relay that information to Felicia. 
Hatch, however, acknowledged some prejudice about Roberts and 
agreed to reschedule him for review in December. (Deposition 
of William Milliken, at 8-14; Deposition of Leon Hatch, at 
70-75). 
23. Felicia also contacted Roberts' UMT and Weldon 
Morgan. She told Morgan that Roberts had indeed changed since 
his days at the State Industrial School. Based on Felicia's 
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representations and favorable reports on Roberts received from 
the prison, Morgan agreed to accept Roberts at the Ogden 
facility if he were approved by the A.R. Board. (Deposition of 
Weldon Morgan, at 20-21; Deposition of Marvin Hansen, at 7). 
24. The UMT again submitted Roberts' name to the A.R. 
Board the first week of December for transfer to Ogden. The 
A.R. Board met on December 10, 1982, and considered Roberts' 
case as one of about ninety classification changes. Roberts' 
proposed transfer was discussed at length, and as he sometimes 
did with difficult cases, Associate Warden Hatch opened the 
voting to all those in attendance. The majority of those 
present favored transfer, although Eldon Barnes, a member of 
the A.R. Board, testified that he thought Roberts' transfer was 
denied. Hatch had to leave the meeting, and later asked Barnes 
to sign the type-written results of the meeting. Barnes' sig-
nature appears on the classification review sheet showing 
Roberts' transfer was approved. (Deposition of Leon Hatch, at 
19 and 98; Deposition of Eldon Barnes, at 48). 
25. Once approved by the A.R. Board, Roberts was cleared 
for immediate transfer to Ogden, subject to availability of 
space. Weldon Morgan called John Powers, Chairman of the Com-
munity Corrections Centers Screening Committee, on December 17, 
and asked Powers to complete the necessary arrangements for 
Morgan to pick up Roberts on December 22. (Deposition of 
Weldon Morgan, at 23-26). 
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26. John Powers did not convene the Community Corrections 
Centers Screening Committee prior to approving Weldon Morgan's 
decision to accept Roberts' transfer to Ogden. Powers was 
convinced by his conversations with Morgan that Morgan was 
agreeable to working with Roberts. Powers agreed that the 
Ogden Center presented the best chance for Roberts to succeed: 
Morgan knew Roberts, he had a track record of success with 
difficult cases, and Roberts' wife was living and gainfully 
employed in Ogden. Powers was certain that the other Directors 
would acquiesce in Morgan's judgment and his desire to work 
with Roberts, and would approve the transfer. Roberts would be 
paroled soon in any event, and the purpose of the halfway house 
was to do what it could to prepare inmates for life on the 
outside. (Deposition of John Powers, at 40-45). 
27. Weldon Morgan picked up Roberts at the prison and 
transported him to Ogden on December 22. During the drive to 
Ogden, Morgan had a long talk with Roberts and as a result 
Morgan's feelings were reinforced that Roberts was sincere 
about changing his life and making the most of this oppor-
tunity. Upon arrival at the facility, Morgan discussed the 
halfway house rules with Roberts and reviewed the Resident 
Contract Roberts was required to sign acknowledging that he 
understood the rules and would abide by them. Morgan then 
called Felicia at work and told her Roberts was at the center; 
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she arrived shortly thereafter. (Deposition of Weldon Morgan, 
at 36-40). 
28. The Ogden Center was scheduled to close for the 
Christmas holiday, allowing both residents and staff to spend 
the holiday with family. Felicia had told Weldon Morgan how 
excited she was to spend a belated honeymoon and Christmas with 
her husband. Prior to releasing Roberts to go with his wife, 
Morgan reviewed the rules with Roberts and Felicia and gave 
each of them his business card, and his home phone number, 
instructing them to call him if they needed help or had any 
problems over the holiday. (Deposition of Weldon Morgan, at 
39-40). 
29. Roberts was allowed to leave the Center that same 
afternoon (the 22nd) with Felicia to attend to some personal 
matters. He was to return to the facility by 11:00 p.m. that 
night, which he did, without incident. Felicia did not notice 
anything unusual about Roberts that evening and there is no 
indication he consumed any drugs or alcohol. (Deposition of 
Felicia Santos, at 116-17). 
30. The next morning, December 23, Roberts left the Ogden 
Center with Felicia. He was to return by 11:00 p.m. on 
December 25. Roberts says that he obtained some drugs from 
another inmate (whom he refuses to identify) prior to leaving 
the facility. (Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 76-81). 
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31. Upon leaving the Center, Roberts and Felicia ran some 
errands and then returned to Felicia's apartment where Roberts 
took a shower and Felicia left to go to the bank. Roberts 
testified that while Felicia was gone he started ingesting 
drugs, beginning with an amphetamine (Preludin). He says that 
he took large quantities of amphetamine throughout the day 
while he and Felicia made a trip from Ogden to Provo and back. 
During this time they visited friends, and bought and delivered 
Christmas gifts. Felicia did see Roberts take seven or eight 
of her amphetamine diet pills, smoke some marijuana and drink 
two or three cans of beer over the course of the day's 
activities. According to Felicia, however, Roberts drove all 
day without noticeable adverse effect. (Deposition of Felicia 
Santos, at 52-56; Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 80-87). 
32. While returning to Ogden, Roberts told Felicia that he 
wanted to have a party that night. They stopped at a friend's 
house and, upon Roberts' request, Felicia invited her friend to 
the party and asked her if she had any marijuana. The girl 
denied the party invitation but did provide some marijuana. 
(Deposition of Felicia Santos, at 57-60). 
33. Roberts and Felicia went on to their apartment, arriv-
ing at about 10:00 p.m. Felicia left to buy beer and some food 
for their holiday meals. Upon Roberts' request, she again 
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stopped at her girlfriend's home and asked her to come back to 
the apartment for a party. While Felicia was gone, Roberts 
claims he ingested PCP ("angel dust"). (Deposition of Kenneth 
Roberts, at 87-88; Deposition of Felicia Santos, 57-60). 
34. When Felicia returned, she saw Roberts peering out of 
the bedroom window through the curtains with the bedroom lights 
out. As she entered the apartment, Roberts came out of the 
bedroom with a rolled up sleeping bag and asked for the keys to 
her car. He refused to tell her where he was going and left at 
about 11:00 p.m. in Felicia's red Pontiac, the registration of 
which listed the address of Roberts' brother. She later 
recalled that Roberts had asked her that morning where she kept 
her .357 pistol and he told her that they would have to get rid 
of it because it violated the halfway house rules. Felicia 
then discovered the gun was missing; apparently Roberts had 
hidden it inside the rolled up sleeping bag and taken it with 
him. (Deposition of Felicia Roberts, at 59-62). 
35. Inexplicably, Felicia did not call Weldon Morgan at 
that time to tell him what happened. Instead, she called some 
friends in Salt Lake City, one of whom told Felicia not to 
worry, that Roberts would not do anything stupid and that he 
just needed to get away for awhile to do some thinking. 
Felicia sat up all night waiting for Roberts to return home. 
(Id. at 65-67). 
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36. In the morning Felicia received a call from Roberts' 
brother in Salt Lake City. He informed her that he had been 
visited by the police, who had traced the red Pontiac, and that 
Roberts was the prime suspect in several crimes. Only then did 
Felicia call Weldon Morgan at home, at approximately 9:30 a.m. 
on December 24th. (Id.). 
37. Roberts' recollection of the 12 hour period from the 
time he left Felicia's apartment until he was arrested the next 
day is spotty, disjointed and confused. It appears that some 
time after he left the apartment, Roberts took a hallucinogenic 
drug called "MDA." Roberts had never taken MDA or the PCP 
ingested earlier, before. He told police after his arrest that 
he was high on drugs and alcohol. (Deposition of Kenneth 
Roberts, at 93-94; Board of Pardons File, Police Reports, 
Record on Appeal, at 375-81). 
38. The first thing Roberts remembers after leaving the 
apartment in Ogden is being pulled over by a police officer in 
the Salt Lake City area. While talking to the officer, "some-
thing clicked" in his mind and he became paranoid that the 
police, including this particular officer, wanted to kill him. 
Roberts was prepared to shoot the policeman, but the officer 
did not arrest Roberts, and he went on his way. After that, 
however, Roberts was convinced that the police were after him, 
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"herding" him to a specific location where they would kill 
him. (Deposition of Kenneth Roberts, at 90-102). 
39. At about 3:20 a.m., Roberts entered the plaintiff's 
neighborhood in the south part of Salt Lake valley. He saw a 
police car patrolling the area. Still under the influence of 
drugs, and still paranoid, he randomly turned into a cul-de-sac 
and spotted LaDawn Prue getting out of her car. He jumped out 
of his car, put the gun to her head and ordered her into his 
car; he wanted a hostage to help him escape the police dragnet 
which was closing in on him. (Id., at 101; Board of Pardons 
File, Police Reports, supra). 
40. Even though plaintiff was complying with Roberts' 
orders, he inexplicably shot her twice and left her lying in 
front of her home. Later he broke into a home only to be con-
fronted and chased away by the woman of the house; he then 
robbed a woman at gunpoint, kidnapped a different woman, had a 
shoot-out with police, and finally surrendered at 11:00 a.m. 
that morning on a road a short distance from the State Prison. 
(Deposition of Kenneth Roberts; Board of Pardons File, Police 
Records, supra). 
41. Roberts pled guilty to five felony charges arising 
from the crime spree: attempted criminal homicide, aggravated 
burglary, armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and being a 
habitual criminal. He is presently incarcerated in maximum 
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security at the Utah State Prison with a Board of Pardons first 
review date of 1998. (Board of Pardons File, Miscellaneous 
Documents V, Record on Appeal, at 382-85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fundamental public policy issues are inextricably inter-
woven with the legal issues presented by this case. While 
considering the scope of governmental immunity, the meaning of 
discretionary function, and common law official immunity, this 
Court must also give consideration to the purposes and pros-
pects for corrections in this state, to the allocation of risks 
associated with the corrections and criminal justice systems, 
as well as the disparate roles of the judicial, legislative and 
the executive branches of state government. Recent legislative 
changes in sentencing parameters and the resulting over-crowded 
conditions at corrections facilities, the consequential 
unavoidable early release of adjudicated prisoners, with the 
concomitant risk of crimes being committed by these early 
releasees, require that greater consideration be given to the 
underlying policy and legal issues here than might otherwise be 
the case. 
Specific provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
and authoritative case law hold that respondents are not liable 
for the independent criminal acts of a third person, at least 
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where government employees acted within the scope of their 
employment, committed no willful or malicious wrong, and 
exercised discretion. 
A recent decision of this Court, Doe v. Arguelles, infra, 
upon which appellant bases virtually her entire case, is not 
consistent with recent developments in the law of governmental 
immunity and discretionary function. Although Doe v. Arguelles 
was a logical, albeit radical, extension of predecessor cases 
dealing with these issues, the opinion was written without the 
benefit of briefing on the recent significant changes in fed-
eral case law interpretation of these same legal principles. 
In view of this Court's longstanding precedent of following the 
lead of federal interpretation in this area, the recent federal 
developments require a re-evaluation of Doe v. Arguelles. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND DIS-
POSITIVE CASE LAW BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
A. The Act's Three-Step Test for Governmental Immunity. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") codifies the 
common law principle that a governmental entity is generally 
immune from suit. The Act then establishes a three-step test 
for determining whether immunity applies in a particular case: 
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(1) The first step is to determine whether the injury 
complained of resulted "from the exercise of a governmental 
function." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983). If so, 
there is immunity from suit. 
(2) Step two is to determine whether immunity is waived by 
the Act for the particular governmental function in question. 
Both the Act and cases interpreting the Act instruct that any 
waiver must be strictly construed, and that an explicit expres-
sion of waiver and satisfaction of any qualifiers enumerated in 
the waiver itself must precede application of the waiver. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3, 4 and 15; Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627 (Utah 1983); Holt v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 511 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1973). 
(3) The third step is to determine whether the waiver of 
immunity is subject to any exception. For example, if the 
waiver in question is that found in Section 10(1) of the Act, 
waiving immunity for injuries "proximately caused by a negli-
gent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope 
of his employment," it remains to be determined whether any one 
of the exceptions enumerated there retains immunity. 
1. Step One: Governmental Function. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
states: "Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all 
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governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function. . . . " 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared that: 
There can be no question but that the maintenance of a 
state prison and the keeping of prisoners therein is a 
necessary auxiliary of government and therefore a 
governmental function, nor that consequently the per-
formance of the duties incident thereto would normally 
be protected by the traditional rule of sovereign 
immunity. 
Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 368 (1968). 
In 1980, the Supreme Court formulated a test for determin-
ing whether the activity of a governmental entity is an exer-
cise of a governmental function and thus entitled to immunity. 
In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1980), the Court wrote: 
We therefore hold that the test for determining 
governmental immunity is whether the activity under 
consideration is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency or that it 
is essential to the core of governmental activity. 
Id. at 1237. The Court expanded on this test a year later: 
The first part of the Standiford test — activity 
of such unique nature that it can only be performed by 
a governmental agency — does not refer to what gov-
ernment may do, but to what governmental alone must do 
. . . . [T]he second part of the Standiford test 
"essential to the core of governmental activity" — , 
. . . refers to those activities not unique in them-
selves (and thus not qualifying under the first part) 
but essential to the performance of those activities 
that are uniquely governmental. 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981) 
(emphasis in original). 
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While Sheffield predates Standiford and Johnson, there 
nevertheless should be no doubt of the correctness of 
Sheffield* s conclusion: "that the maintenance of the State 
Prison and the keeping of prisoners therein is a necessary 
auxiliary of government and therefore a governmental func-
tion." It is self-evident that the apprehension, prosecution, 
confinement, punishment, and rehabilitation of criminals is 
peculiarly the province of government. These are precisely the 
types of activities which are uniquely governmental, something 
that "government alone must do" in the discharge of the 
Constitutional mandate to provide for the general welfare, and 
deserving of the immunity provided by the Act. 
2. Step Two: Waiver. 
Appellant's Amended Complaint makes no reference to any 
express waiver of immunity upon which suit can be brought. 
However, the nature of her claims could rely on no waiver other 
than that found in Section 63-30-10(1) of the Act. Like the 
other express waivers set forth in the Act, the express waiver 
of Section 63-30-10(1) has significant and unavoidable quali-
fiers attached. Failure to satisfy the qualifications for 
waiver set forth in this section means simply that the waiver 
does not apply and that immunity remains. The waiver, with its 
three qualifiers underscored and identified, reads as follows: 
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Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury [1] proximately caused [2] by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee [3] committed 
within the scope of his employment . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added). 
The Legislature specifically limited this particular waiver 
to situations where a "negligent act or omission" of a govern-
ment employee, acting within the scope of his employment, 
"proximately caused" the injury complained of. Proximate 
causation and negligence are legal terms of art that the Legis-
lature is presumed to have used knowingly and purposefully. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11. This waiver, therefore, cannot apply 
where any of these three specific gualifiers are unsatisfied. 
First, it must be found that an employee or the entity owed 
a duty to the injured party. The existence of a legal duty 
running from defendant to plaintiff is a reguisite element of 
any negligence claim, Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1979), and, where no legal duty exists, no legal causation is 
recognized. Where there is no legal causation, as a matter of 
law, there can be no proximate causation. See Prosser, Hand-
book of the Law of Torts, 244 (4th ed. 1971). 
The issue of existence of duty is a guestion of law for the 
court. See Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Kulick, 
621 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. 1980); Moewes v. Farmer's Insurance 
Group, 641 P.2d 740, 741 (Wyo. 1982); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 
§ 34 (1971). A finding by this Court that the defendants owed 
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no duty to plaintiff precludes application of the waiver of 
Section 63-30-10(1), and immunity remains. Conversely, a find-
ing that a duty exists requires an assumption that the waiver 
of immunity cited above applies, and would then require con-
sideration of the enumerated exceptions to the waiver which are 
found in subsections (a) through (1) of Section 63-30-10(1), 
Because respondents believe that several Utah Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with the enumerated exceptions to the waiver 
of immunity are dispositive of this case, it will be presumed, 
for the purposes of this portion of the argument only, that a 
duty exists, that the waiver of Section 63-30-10(1) applies, 
and that the enumerated exceptions to the waiver should be 
considered. 
3. Step Three: Exceptions to the Waiver. 
Section 63-30-10(1) lists several distinct, well-defined 
exceptions to the general waiver of immunity for employee neg-
ligence. These exceptions are listed in the alternative rather 
than conjunctive, and thus only one need apply to void the 
waiver. In cases with facts remarkably similar to the instant 
case, both of which are discussed below, this Court has applied 
two of these exceptions to preserve immunity. 
The waiver and the two exceptions read as follows: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all government entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
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act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of his employment, except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function whether or not the discretion is abused, or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any per-
son _in any state prison, county or city jail or other 
place of legal confinement . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(1)(a) and (j) (emphasis added). 
These exceptions will be analyzed in reverse order. 
B. Incarceration Exception Bars Appellant's Claims. 
In Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971), this Court 
affirmed the dismissal of a claim against the State for the 
death of a patient who was voluntarily confined at the State 
Hospital. Applying the exception of Section 63-30-10(1)(j), 
the Court held that the statutory reference to "other place of 
legal confinement," when read in its entirety, "obviously 
referred to something other than a 'jail1 or 'state prison,' 
including a hospital where one cannot be released without some 
kind of permission." 483 P.2d at 1297. 
Five years later, this Court reaffirmed Emery and held that 
the arising-out-of-incarceration exception barred a claim for 
the death of a woman killed by a prison inmate who had walked 
away from his prison "work release" job shortly before the 
murder. Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976). In Epting, 
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prison officials had granted the prisoner the privilege of 
participating in the prison's "work release" program. The 
prisoner was released from the prison each day, driven to work, 
and then picked up after work and returned to the prison. One 
day, the prisoner walked away from his job and that evening 
killed plaintiffs1 decedent. 
The Epting plaintiffs claimed that the State negligently 
failed to keep the prisoner incarcerated or under surveil-
lance. The Court affirmed a Summary Judgment in favor of the 
State based on both the discretionary function exception and 
the arising-out-of-incarceration exception. With regard to the 
incarceration exception, the Court declared: 
As to the status of [the prisoner] vis-a-vis the state 
prison, there seemed to be just two alternatives, 
either: (a) he had totally escaped the control of the 
prison and was thus acting on his own so the prison 
was not responsible for him; or (b) he was still under 
the control of the prison authorities so that his 
conduct would "arise out of the incarceration of any 
person in the state prison . . ."in which latter 
instance the prison is immune from suit under the 
statute. 
Epting, 546 P.2d at 244. 
Two other Utah Supreme Court decisions, Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), and Madsen v. State, 583 
P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), are consistent with and support the hold-
ings in Emery and Epting. In Madsen, the wife and daughter of 
a prison inmate who had died following surgery in the prison 
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hospital filed a wrongful death action against the Utah State 
Prison and selected employees. The Madsen Court concluded that 
the plain meaning of the incarceration exception to the waiver 
of immunity found in Section 10(1) of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act "reflects a legislative intent to retain sovereign 
immunity for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated 
person is in prison and under the control of the state." 583 
P.2d at 93. The Court impliedly recognized that the inmate 
technically was not incarcerated in the prison but rather con-
fined to the hospital at the prison. The Court nevertheless 
concluded: "Since this injury occurred while Madsen was under 
the control of prison officials/ the governmental entities, 
vis., the State of Utah and the Board of Corrections, are both 
immune from liability." 583 P.2d at 93 (emphasis added). 
Thus, reaffirming both the reasoning and conclusions of Emery 
and Epting, the Madsen court held that it is the prisoner's 
status and the state's control over the prisoner, rather than 
merely the prisoner's physical location, which are critical to 
the incarceration exception. See also Schmitt, 600 P.2d at 518 
(holding the State immune for loss of inmate's personal prop-
erty) . 
When Kenneth Roberts assaulted the appellant, he was an 
inmate/resident at the halfway house facility in Ogden. He had 
not been paroled by the Board of Pardons and he could not leave 
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the facility without permission. He was still serving time as 
an inmate under the jurisdiction of the State, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 64-13-11, but in a corrections facility less restric-
tive than the State Prison. 
The Ogden halfway house, if not an extension of the State 
Prison itself, clearly constitutes an "other place of legal 
confinement," as defined by this Court in Emery. Kenneth 
Roberts was incarcerated there. Just as the injury in Emery 
arose out of an incarceration in a "place of legal confinement" 
other than a jail or a prison, the injury complained of by 
appellant here arose "out of the incarceration" of Kenneth 
Roberts at a "place of legal confinement." 
The factual setting and plaintiffs' claims in Epting are 
virtually identical to those of the instant case. In both 
cases, the prisoner had not yet been paroled. In Epting, 
prison officials granted Michael Hart, the prisoner, the priv-
ilege of participating in work release away from the prison. 
Here, prison officials granted Kenneth Roberts the privilege of 
transfer to a halfway house, where he was still "under the 
control" of the state in a "prison . . . or other place of 
legal confinement," as defined in Emery, Epting, and Madsen. 
During Hart's employment away from the prison, he generally was 
free to do what people outside prison do when they are gain-
fully employed. During Roberts' Christmas leave from the 
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halfway house, he generally was free to do what people outside 
prison do during Christmas. Hart walked away from his place of 
employment and killed Mrs. Cynthia Epting Mitchell. Roberts 
left his apartment and his wife and shot LaDawn Prue. As in 
Epting, at the time Kenneth Roberts shot LaDawn Prue, either 
(a) he had totally escaped the control of corrections authori-
ties and was acting on his own, "so the prison was not respon-
sible for him;" or (b) he was under the control of corrections 
authorities and thus LaDawn Prue's injuries arose "out of the 
incarceration of any person in the state prison . . . or other 
place of legal confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(j) . 
Under either view, the State cannot be held liable for LaDawn 
Prue's injuries. To hold otherwise, this Court must, unavoid-
ably, overturn Epting, Emery and Madsen. 
C. Discretionary Function Exception Bars Appellant's 
Claims. 
1. Epting v. State Is Dispositive Here. 
This Court has been clear and consistent in its pronounce-
ments that the decisions, programs and efforts of corrections 
officials in attempting the difficult task of managing and 
rehabilitating adjudicated criminals, require the exercise of 
discretion. Prisoner "rehabilitation is the responsibility of 
professional men and the manner in which it is accomplished 
must be a matter of discretion." Beal v. Turner, Warden, 22 
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Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624, 626 (1969). MWe think there is not 
much doubt that the use of work release programs is a 
worthwhile effort toward the . . . objective [of rehabilita-
tion] . But that is within the discretion of the prison 
authorities to decide." Epting v. State, 546 P.2d at 244. 
"[There] is the imperative need for those in a supervisory 
capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the burdensome 
responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining 
discipline of a large number of men who have been convicted of 
serious crime." Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d at 369. 
These declarations clearly enunciate that not only the 
decision-making processes involved but also the actual opera-
tion of corrections facilities and the handling of prisoners 
confined therein are discretionary and fall within the dis-
cretionary function exception of subsection (a) of Section 
63-30-10(1). In Beal, the Court enunciated the policy 
affording this discretion: 
The Board of Pardons and the men in the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department are striving in a 
professional way to rehabilitate adjudicated crimi-
nals, so that these criminals may take their place in 
a law-abiding society. To accomplish this objective, 
the Board of Pardons and the Adult Probation and 
Parole Department must have leeway in taking chances 
and enlarging the ambit of a promising prisoner, 
[even] when the confidence which they had in the 
parolee is [later] seen to be misplaced . . . . 
Beal v. Turner, Warden, 454 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). The 
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Epting Court also recognized the difficulties facing prison 
authorities in developing rehabilitation programs and in apply-
ing those programs to particular prisoners. The Court declared: 
In regard to the problem: whether the placing of 
a prisoner in a "work release" program comes within 
subsection [(a)] above quoted as "the exercise . . . . 
of . . . a discretionary function, . . . ," we make 
the following observations: The prison authorities 
are faced with a dilemma which has always existed in 
penal institutions: As to what extent they are 
furnishing an education for further crime, or for the 
rehabilitation of prisoners into useful citizenship. 
We think there is not much doubt that the use of work 
release programs is a worthwhile effort toward the 
latter objective. But that is within the discretion 
of the prison authorities to decide. In addition to 
the exercise of this judgment as to the value and 
practicability of such a program generally, there are 
problems about its advisability as to each individual 
prisoner. In order to weigh the positive values of 
possible benefit for him in such a program against the 
negative factors such as the likelihood of his escap-
ing and engaging in more anti-social conduct, it is 
essential to consider the various aspects of his per-
sonality: his intelligence, aptitudes and qualities 
of character such as honesty, integrity and industry; 
and whether he has demonstrated a sincere desire to 
rehabilitate himself so that there is a reasonable 
probability that he will succeed. Accordingly, we 
agree with the view of the trial court that the 
handling of the prisoner Michael Hart was something 
which "arises out of the exercise of a discretionary 
function" for which subsection [(a)] of Section 
63-30-10[(1)] quoted above has retained its sovereign 
immunity. 
Epting, 546 P.2d at 244 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Note that Epting framed the issue not in terms of whether 
merely deciding to place an inmate in a work release program 
was discretionary, but rather in terms of whether the actual 
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placement of the inmate into the program was discretionary. 
The Court, focusing on events which occurred after the decision 
was made to place the inmate in work release and centering its 
attention upon the the actual implementation of the work 
release decision, held that the "handling of the prisoner" was 
a discretionary function for which immunity was not waived. Id. 
Use of the phrase "handling of the prisoner," read in light 
of the discussion of the inherent difficulty in dealing with a 
particular inmate's personality, intelligence, potential for 
rehabilitation, etc., and how and to what extent such programs 
should be made available to that inmate, makes it clear that 
the Epting Court used those broad words advisedly. "Handling 
the prisoner" must therefore include decisions regarding the 
prisoner's classification within the system, implementation of 
those decisions, supervising the prisoner's work release pro-
gram, monitoring the prisoner's participation in work release, 
granting freedoms commensurate with work release, and all other 
activities undertaken by corrections officials in connection 
with the incarceration and attempted rehabilitation of the 
prisoner. 
The facts of Epting, with no significant differences, are 
the facts of the instant case. The issues addressed by the 
Epting Court, with no more than cosmetic alterations, are the 
issues presented here. Corrections officials' "handling" of 
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Kenneth Roberts, including the decision to transfer him to a 
halfway house and the monitoring of Roberts after his move to 
the halfway house, cannot be distinguished from the "handling" 
of Michael Hart in the Epting case. Epting's holding that 
"handling of the prisoner" on work release was a discretionary 
function is consistent with Beal v. Turner, supra, and 
Sheffield v. Turner, supra, and is dispositive of the dis-
cretionary function issue. 
2. Epting v. State Is Still Good Law. 
Appellant argues that Epting is suspect and is no 
longer good law. Appellant asserts that some Utah Supreme 
Court cases decided after Epting have applied an analysis of 
the discretionary function exception different than that used 
in Epting, and which, if applied here, would require this Court 
to reverse Epting and rule that the discretionary function 
exception does not apply. Appellant misconstrues the law. 
In the 1972 decision of Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 27 
Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a State road supervisor's decision to use berms as the 
sole means of warning travelers that a road was closed, was not 
a basic policy decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of some basic governmental policy, program or 
objective. 496 P.2d at 891. In arriving at this decision, the 
court adopted a planning level-operational level dichotomy 
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analysis. Citing decisions from the Supreme Courts of Hawaii 
and California, and making reference to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, which contains a discretionary function exception virtual-
ly identical to that found in the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, the Carroll Court discussed "the principle that although 
basic policy decisions are allowed immunity, this exception is 
not extended to the ministerial implementation of that basic 
policy." I_d. Plaintiff relies upon this and similar state-
ments from Carroll and its progeny as support for the argument 
that the discretionary function exception does not apply to the 
facts of this case. 
The Carroll Court, however, specifically concluded that: 
[A] valid consideration in evaluating a factual situa-
tion was whether there was a reason for sovereign 
immunity, i.e., did the employee's decision . . . rise 
to the level of governmental decisions toward which 
judicial restraint should be exercised. 
Id. This consideration evidently became a deciding factor when 
the Court considered the facts of Epting nearly four years 
later.4 Although not expressly stated in the Epting opinion, 
the Court must have determined that the decisions made by the 
defendants, including those at the lower levels of prison 
administration, whereby Michael Hart was put on work release, 
It must be presumed that the Epting Court, with four 
of the five justices from Carroll still sitting, was well 
aware of the Carroll decision. 
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were decisions which rose "to the level of governmental deci-
sion toward which judicial restraint should be exercised," and 
therefore constituted a discretionary function. If the Epting 
Court had determined otherwise, it would have reversed the 
Summary Judgment granted in favor of the prison authorities. 
Five years after Carroll and one year after Epting, this 
Court analyzed "discretionary function" in Connell v. Tooele 
City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). In Connell, the Utah Supreme 
Court discussed in detail the distinction between "discretion-
ary" and "ministerial" duties. Adopting the distinction used 
by Dean Prosser, the Court wrote: 
. . . [A]cts which are regarded as "discretionary" or 
"quasi-judicial" in character, require personal 
deliberation, decision and judgment, and those which 
are merely "ministerial" amount[] only to obedience to 
an order, or the performance of a duty in which the 
officer is left no choice of his own. 
The reason for the distinction between discre-
tionary and ministerial duties has been enunciated by 
several authorities and we believe this distinction to 
be necessary and sound. For if every employee or 
officer of the government were to be held liable, 
individually, for errors in judgment or exercise of 
the discretion, which his employment requires him to 
make, such employee would fear to make decisions and 
the administration of government could be seriously 
jeopardized. On the other hand, if the employee's 
duties require no exercise of judgment or discretion, 
the reason for protecting his actions does not exist. 
572 P.2d at 699, citing Prosser, The Law of Torts, §§ 131-132 
(4th ed. 1977). 
-37-
The conclusions in Epting are consistent with the analy-
tical framework adopted by the Court in Connell for determining 
whether particular responsibilities of government employees are 
discretionary and thus immune from suit. The "personal delib-
eration, decision and judgment" exercised by the respondents in 
Connell, Epting, and in the instant case, constitute discre-
tionary functions in fact and in law, consistent with this 
Court's decisions regarding corrections activities. 
Appellant argues in her Brief that the recent case of Doe 
v. Arguelles, 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Dec. 27, 1985), in essence 
overrules Epting and those cases which support it. Contrary to 
appellant's position, however, it is Doe v. Arguelles, and not 
Epting, that is an aberration from the orderly development of 
the law of discretionary function. 
3. Recent Developments in the Law Regarding Applica-
tion of the Discretionary Function Exception 
Support the Conclusions of Epting v. State. 
(a) Developments in the Law up to 1984. 
Utah's discretionary function exception to the waiver of 
immunity closely parallels the discretionary function exception 
found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(the "FTCA"). Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam. Serv., 667 
P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme Court "has followed 
the lead of cases interpreting that act." Id.; Frank v. State, 
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613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980). Indeed, this Court expressly 
adopted the planning level-operational level test for discre-
tionary function developed by some federal courts, which 
distinguished "between those decisions occurring at a broad, 
policy-making level and those taking place at the implementing 
'operational' level." Frank, 613 P.2d at 519. See also, 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Carroll v. State 
Road Comm'n, supra. This level-oriented, dichotomy approach 
grants discretionary immunity to those decisions made at the 
policy-making level, but denies immunity for acts and decisions 
made at the implementing or operational level because such 
decisions are "ministerial" rather than "discretionary." 
As noted by this Court in Little, supra, the federal case 
law interpreting the FTCA's discretionary function exception 
began with Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In 
Dalehite, claims against the United States were made under the 
FTCA for damages resulting from an explosion of fertilizer 
which had been manufactured and distributed under the direction 
and control of the federal government. In holding for the 
government, the Court discussed at length the discretionary 
function exception of the FTCA and held that 
[T]he "discretionary function" . . . includes more 
than the initiation of programs and activities. It 
also includes determinations made by executives or 
administrators in establishing plans, specifications 
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or schedules of operations. Where there is room for 
policy judgment and decision there is discretion. 
346 U.S. at 35-36 (emphasis added). 
The Dalehite Court did not stop at the "executive or 
administrator" level, however, holding that: 
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in 
carrying out the operations of government in accor-
dance with official directions cannot be actionable. 
If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would 
fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when a 
subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal 
step, each action or nonaction being directed by the 
superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Even though the Court 
refused "to define, apart from this case, precisely where dis-
cretion ends," id. at 35, the Court clearly and unambiguously 
included within the parameters of discretionary function the 
acts of subordinates implementing policy-level decisions of 
superiors. 
A number of federal courts following Dalehite, however, 
tended to ignore the Dalehite holding immunizing subordinate 
implementation of policy decisions, and instead focused 
narrowly on one sentence, arguably dicta, found elsewhere in 
the opinion: "The decisions held culpable were all responsibly 
made at the planning rather than operational level and involved 
considerations more or less important to the practicability of 
the Government's fertilizer program." Id. at 42. With the 
help of two post-Dalehite opinions from the Supreme Court, 
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which were generally interpreted to veer away from the Dalehite 
holding, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 
(1955), and Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 
62 (1955), aff'd per curiam sub nom., United States v. Union 
Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955), the planning level-operational 
level dichotomy approach to applying the discretionary function 
exception of the FTCA began taking shape. 
The post-Dalehite federal cases, for the most part, drew an 
imaginary line between upper echelon planning level decision-
makers and lower level "operational" employees who were charged 
with executing or implementing the policy, plan or program. 
The decision-makers above the line were granted immunity pur-
suant to the discretionary function exception. Those below the 
line, and their activities, regardless of the discretion or 
judgment involved, were labeled "ministerial" and subject to 
liability. See Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476 (D. 
Utah 1981), and cases cited therein. These federal cases 
invariably cite Dalehite as the source of this level-oriented 
dichotomy approach, but in doing so completely disregarded the 
Dalehite Court's holding that "acts of subordinates in carrying 
out the operations of government . . . cannot be actionable." 
346 U.S. at 36. 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the lead of these post-
Dalehite federal decisions and adopted the dichotomy approach 
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for interpreting and applying the discretionary function excep-
tion of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Beginning with 
Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, supra, and followed by Frank v. 
State, supra, and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, supra, this Court 
struck a course consistent with federal case law applying this 
dichotomy approach that finally reached its logical end with 
Doe v. Arguelles in December of 1985. 
That end result is a non-analytical, outcome-determinative, 
conclusory approach not unlike the pre-Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp. "governmental capacity - propriety capacity" 
distinction used by this Court to determine whether or not 
certain activities were "governmental functions," as that term 
was used in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In Standiford, 
Justice Oaks decried the governmental-proprietary distinction 
as unsatisfactory, inconsistent, arbitrary, senseless and 
incongruous. 605 P.2d at 1233-34. This Court, and numerous 
others, had used the distinction as a "test" even though it 
amounted to little more than justification for a conclusory 
result. 
The same holds true for the planning level-operational 
level distinction used for determining discretionary function. 
It is no longer a test (if it ever was), but is instead a jus-
tification for a result. How the result is reached becomes 
arbitrary and unpredictable. This Court should jettison the 
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planning level-operational level dichotomy approach for inter-
preting and applying the discretionary function exception, and 
replace it with a true analytical framework. The federal 
courts, which created the planning level-operational level 
distinction, have now done just that. This Court should do the 
same. 
(b) Varig Airlines: A Unanimous United States 
Supreme Court Discards the Planning Level-
Operational Level Approach. 
In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984), plaintiffs 
brought suit under the FTCA alleging that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (the "FAA") was negligent in its inspection of 
certain components of an airplane during the course of certi-
ficating the aircraft for commercial use. The United States 
Supreme Court reviewed in detail the legislative history of the 
FTCA's discretionary function exception, quoted liberally from 
Dalehite, and noted that the case law5 had veered from 
Dalehite by adopting the level-oriented, dichotomy approach. 
By unanimous decision, the Court declared that Dalehite "repre-
sents a valid interpretation of the discretionary function 
exception." Id. at 2764. The Court isolated two determinative 
The Court admitted that even its own reading of the 
discretionary function exception "has not followed a 
straight line" after Dalehite. 104 S. Ct. at 2764. 
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factors that should be used "in determining when the acts of a 
government employee are protected from liability by [the dis-
cretionary function exception]." .Id. at 2765. 
The first factor effectively prohibits consideration of the 
actor's rank, or his hierarchical position within the decision-
making process, in determining whether the discretionary func-
tion exception applies to that actor's decisions or activities. 
Rather, the Court declared that "the basic inquiry concerning 
the application of the discretionary function exception is 
whether the challenged acts of a government employee—whatever 
his or her rank--are of a nature and quality that Congress 
intended to shield from tort liability." .Id- (emphasis added.) 
Evaluating the facts in Varig Airlines pursuant to this 
factor, the Court held that both the governmental agency's 
decision and the actual implementation of that decision by 
agency employees were immunized from suit by the discretionary 
function exception to the FTCA. I^3« at 2768. In Varig, the 
FAA's employees were empowered to make judgments regarding 
private persons' compliance with agency regulations, the need 
for changes to maximize compliance, the types of changes neces-
sary, and the allocation of agency resources. The employees 
"necessarily took certain calculated risks, but these risks 
were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose 
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and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in the regula-
tions and operating manuals." Id., at 2768-69. Such, the Court 
declared, "fall sguarely within the discretionary function 
exception." Id. at 2769. 
By eliminating the relevancy of the rank of the actor, 
Varig effectively eliminates any rational basis for the 
planning level-operational level dichotomy developed by some 
federal courts and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. Varig 
instead rejuvenates Dalehite and reguires a basic inguiry into 
the "nature and guality" of the guestioned acts of government 
employees, and prohibits the semantic gymnastics too often used 
to distinguish an act of decision-making from an act of 
implementing that decision. 
Similar to those federal cases which ignored express 
language in Dalehite, this Court, particularly in Doe v. 
Arguelles, ignored language in Frank v. Sate that is remarkably 
consistent with the first key factor delineated by Varig: 
The exception to the statutory waiver here under con-
sideration, however, was intended to shield those 
governmental acts and decisions impacting on larger 
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways 
from individual and class legal actions, the continual 
threat of which would make public administration all 
but impossible. 
Frank, 613 P.2d at 520. This language in Frank and the 
analysis in Varig are reminiscent of this Court's analysis in 
Epting, Beal, and Sheffield: corrections activities, including 
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the difficult task of rehabilitating criminals, are the "nature 
and quality" of government functions which the legislature 
intended to protect from judicial second-guessing. 
The second determinative factor in Varig's analysis is as 
follows: 
[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception 
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass the 
discretionary acts of the Government acting in its 
role as a regulator of the conduct of private indi-
viduals . 
104 S. Ct. at 2765 (footnote omitted). Where government 
engages in corrections activities, government acts in "its role 
as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals" very 
possibly more than in any other activity. Where the government 
determines the extent to which it will supervise an individual 
(which is precisely what the respondents did with Kenneth 
Roberts), "it is exercising discretionary regulatory authority 
of the most basic kind." Id. at 2768. See Jet Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 777 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(supervising and monitoring a federal probationer in the 
Federal Witness Protection Program "involves the regulation of 
the conduct of a private individual within the meaning of Varig 
Airlines"). 
Applying these two factors to the facts in Varig, the 
Supreme Court ruled that both the "decision to implement" the 
FAA "spot-check" system of compliance review for aircraft, and 
"the application of that . . . system to the particular 
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aircraft involved . . . are barred by the discretionary 
function exception to the Act." 104 S. Ct. at 2768. The Varig 
Court thus applied the holding in Dalehite and refused to 
distinguish "discretionary0 decision-making and "ministerial" 
implementation of those decisions. To further emphasize the 
Court's return to Dalehite and the eradication of the planning 
level-operational level dichotomy approach to the discretionary 
function exception, the Court made it clear that: 
Judicial intervention in such decision making through 
private tort suits would require the courts to 
"second-guess" the political, social, and economic 
judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory 
function. It was precisely this sort of judicial 
intervention in policy making that the discretionary 
function exception was designed to prevent. 
Id. The Court emphasized that the FAA employees involved had 
to make "policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence 
that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer"; they 
were required to allocate agency resources in an efficient 
manner; and they were to attempt to "maximize compliance with 
FAA regulations." Id. 6 "It [therefore] follows," the Court 
held, "that the acts of FAA employees in executing the 
'spot-check* program . . . are protected by the discretionary 
function exception as well." Id. 
One might similarly observe that corrections officials 
are required "to make policy judgments regarding the degree 
of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given" 
inmate, to allocate resources, and to attempt to maximize 
inmates' compliance with programs of rehabilitation. 
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The Dalehite holding, which for years was overlooked or 
ignored by the federal courts, has found new life. Varig 
Airlines has done to the planning level-operational level 
distinction what Standiford v. Salt Lake City did to the gov-
ernmental capacity-proprietary capacity distinction: it 
replaced an unsound, conclusory and non-analytical approach 
with a reasoned framework of analysis by which sound legal 
judgments and efficacious policy decisions may be made without 
artificial, semantic distinctions. 
(c) Application of Varig Airlines in the Federal 
Courts 
Since Varig, nine of the eleven federal circuit courts 
considering discretionary function have applied the Varig/ 
Dalehite analysis and have abandoned the planning level-
operational level dichotomy approach.7 The Third Circuit 
The federal appellate court decisions (listed 
numerically by circuit) expressly applying the Varig test 
for discretionary function are: Brown v. United States, 
790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986); Shuman v. United States, 765 
F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 1985); General Pub. Util. Corp. v. 
United States, 745 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1984); Baxley v. 
United States, 767 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1985); Ford v. 
American Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Flammia v. United States, 739 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Cisco v. United States through the E.P.A., 768 F.2d 788 
(7th Cir. 1985); Cunningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445 
(9th Cir. 1986); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 
742 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1984); Russell v. United States, 763 
F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1985); Ostera v. United States, 769 
F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1985). 
(continued) 
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Court of Appeals, for example, observed in General Public 
Utilities Corp. v. United States, 745 at 246 n. 8, that "our 
pre-Varig cases on the discretionary function must be 
re-evaluated." The First Circuit, in Shuman v. United States, 
765 F.2d at 209, noted that "after Varig, 'our canvas of 
authorities is accordingly narrow.'" 
The federal district courts have reacted similarly8 to 
Varig. The District Court in Kansas matter-of-factly ack-
nowledged that in Varig, "the Supreme Court rejected the 
planning level/operational level line of cases adopted by 
various courts." Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 
(continued) 
Even prior to Varig, some federal courts saw problems 
with the level-oriented discretionary approach. In 1980, 
the Third Circuit characterized the planning level-opera-
tional level distinction as an ineffective "semantic 
attempt to decide in which category [a] case falls." 
Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 951 (3rd Cir. 
1980) . 
See Chrisley v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 285 
(D.S.C. 1985); In re Consolidated United States Atmos-
pheric Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 
1985); Bradley v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 
1985); Ayala v. Joy Mfg. Co., 610 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo. 
1985); Cunningham v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 1016 (D. 
Mont. 1985); Bosco v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 611 F. 
Supp. 449 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Wendler v. United States, 606 
F. Supp. 148 (D. Kan. 1985); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. 
Corp. v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984); 
Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 394 (D. Kan. 1984); 
Jet Industries, Inc. v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 643 
(W.D. Tex. 1984). 
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at 434. In Bradley v. United States, supra, the Court declared 
that if any question remained as to the appropriateness of the 
planning level-operational level test, "it has now been 
definitively laid to rest by Varig." 615 F. Supp. at 206 n.2. 
See also In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing 
Litigation, 616 F. Supp. at 774 (the "continual vitality" of 
the planning level-operational level distinction "was in doubt" 
after Varig). 
More important, however, than these decisions acknowledging 
the demise of the planning level-operational level analysis, is 
the manner in which the federal courts have been applying 
Varig. In Flammia v. United States, supra, plaintiff brought 
an action against the government to recover damages for 
injuries sustained when he was shot by a Cuban national named 
Diaz who had been admitted into the United States by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS"). Appellant 
alleged that INS personnel were negligent in: (a) releasing 
Diaz from its care, custody and control when it knew Diaz was a 
felon convicted of a violent crime and had a propensity to 
commit a similar crime in the future; (b) failing to maintain 
supervision over Diaz after his release; (c) failing to notify 
appropriate law enforcement agencies of Diaz's criminal record; 
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and (d) failing to take Diaz into custody after Diaz had been 
convicted of a felony in the United States.9 739 F.2d at 204. 
The Flammia Court quoted extensively from Varig and held: 
[0]n the basis of Varig Airlines we must reject 
appellant's attempt to distinguish between high-level 
decisions concerning the admission or release of Cuban 
refugees in general and the specific operational deci-
sion to admit and release Diaz. . . . We view the 
language of Varig Airlines to dictate that the exemp-
tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act derived from 
this discretion extends to specific individual appli-
cations as well as to broad policies. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Flammia Court stated further that in 
releasing and supervising foreign nationals, the INS was acting 
"in its role 'as a regulator of the conduct of private indi-
viduals.,M Id., at 205, quoting Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765. 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court applied the two tests from Varig, 
i.e., the nature of the government conduct and regulation by 
government of private individuals, to issues identical to those 
presented by the instant case, found the discretionary function 
exception applicable and dispositive, and affirmed the dis-
missal of plaintiff's claims. 
The first two allegations of negligence in Flammia are 
identical to the allegations in the instant case, i.e., 
negligent release and supervision. Appellant here has 
taken obvious care to describe these alleged negligent acts 
in terms suggesting that such are operational in nature, 
and thereby attempt to apply the planning level-opera-
tional level approach to discretionary function. The 
plaintiff in Flammia likewise carefully characterized the 
actions (or inactions) of INS personnel as operational, but 
to no avail under the Varig/Dalehite analysis. 
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The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Varig and Dalehite, did 
likewise in Ostera v. United States, supra. There, the FBI had 
obtained the release from a South Carolina jail of an adjudi-
cated criminal for use as an informant. After his early 
release, the informant attacked plaintiff, blinding him in one 
eye. Recognizing that down-line decisions and actions imple-
menting up-line decisions and policies cannot be arbitrarily 
distinguished from those up-line decisions and policies for the 
purpose of ascribing liability, the Ostera Court declared: 
The decision to seek the release of an informant 
from prison is inextricably intertwined in the decision 
to use him as an informant. The decision to use a 
particular person as an informant is inextricably 
intertwined in the policy decision to use informants 
for law enforcement purposes. "Where there is room for 
policy judgment and decision there is discretion. . . . " 
. . . Neither the decision to use a particular person 
as an informant nor the decision to obtain release of 
that person from prison is subject to judicial scruti-
ny. . ., the government being immune from suit. . . 
under the discretionary function exception. . . . 
769 F.2d at 718, quoting Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36. 
The Ostera Court recognized that a decision to use an 
adjudicated criminal as an informant cannot rationally be 
differentiated from the actual use of that informant. Simi-
larly, the decision to obtain the release of an inmate from 
prison cannot be distinguished from the actual obtainment of 
the release, except by post-Dalehite/pre-Varig reasoning. The 
Ostera Court and all other federal courts herein cited, by 
barring claims for damages resulting from operational negli-
gence, have discarded the judicially-created barrier between 
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deciding policy and implementing policy. So long as (a) the 
acts in question are of the nature and quality the legislature 
intended to protect from liability, (b) the acts involve 
governmental regulation of private individuals, and (c) the 
implementation of policy and goals has been left to the dis-
cretion of a governmental agency, then the implementation of 
decisions or policy is protected by the discretionary function 
exception,l° 
One of the most recent and best-reasoned post-Varig deci-
sions is Brown v. United States, supra. In Brown, plaintiffs 
were operating fishing vessels off the coast of Massachusetts 
and were caught in a storm, resulting in loss of lives and 
In Cisco v. United States through the E.P.A., supra, 
the Court reiterated the general rule with regard to dis-
cretionary function analysis: "Whether the [government 
agency] acted negligently or even abused its discretion 
has no effect on the applicability of the discretionary 
function exception." 768 F.2d at 789. 
The Court in Cisco added that, after Varig, where 
"Congress has left to the EPA to decide the manner in 
which, and the extent to which, it will protect individ-
uals and their property from exposure to hazardous 
wastes," the agency's actions fall within the Varig 
factors and the discretionary function exception bars 
claims based thereon. .Id. (emphasis added). In the 
instant case, the state legislature has left to the 
Division of Corrections "the manner in which, and the 
extent to which, it will protect individuals and their 
property from exposure to hazardous" inmates, halfway 
house residents or parolees. Such discretion and the 
implementation thereof, have the nature and quality of 
activities the legislature intended to protect and 
constitute government regulation of the conduct of private 
individuals in its strictest sense. 
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vessels. Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions against the 
government, claiming that the National Weather Service was 
negligent "in not earlier predicting the storm's true path," 
and the District Court awarded damages, 790 F.2d at 200. The 
First Circuit Court reversed, and, in so doing, expertly 
pointed out that the pre-Varig discretionary function analysis 
"would make the discretionary exception self-destructive." Id. 
at 203. 
The Brown Court reviewed a Second Circuit case which the 
District Court in Brown had relied on, Eklof Marine Corp. v. 
United States, 762 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1985), which held that 
even though the Coast Guard had no duty to mark a dangerous 
location at sea, once they decided to mark that danger and set 
a buoy there, they thereby accepted a duty and were thus 
obligated to perform that duty fully, "even, if necessary, to 
the point of setting two or three buoys." Brown, 790 F.2d at 
202. The First Circuit then explained the errors in the Eklof 
reasoning (which similarly apply to Doe v. Arguelles): 
[T]he court failed to consider the pernicious con-
sequences that could flow from its approach. With 
necessarily limited funds, and unable to afford three 
buoys, will a Coast Guard official place one and risk 
heavy damages ($382,000 in Eklof), or place none at 
all and play it safe—from the government's stand-
point? Eklof cuts to the heart of governmental 
discretion, and, in effect, could deprive navigators 
of half a loaf, usually thought better than none. 
Id. Is not the state corrections system faced with a similar 
dilemma? Limited funds and limited personnel versus an ever 
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expanding prison population means that corrections may only be 
capable of providing "half a loaf" of post-prison supervision 
programs designed to facilitate assimilation into the community. 
The principle involved here is not limited to the failure 
to maintain preventive monitoring of a particular prisoner, but 
is universal, and could apply to anything a court might find 
impairs the success of rehabilitation programs. An expert 
might testify, and a court accept, that maintaining adequate 
post-prison programs would call for still additional programs, 
or for more advanced monitoring techniques, or for more per-
sonnel, acl infinitum. A court might even find misfeasance in 
the paperwork associated with the prisoner's processing. See 
Brown, 790 F.2d at 203. 
All of these are matters which Congress [or the state 
legislature] reserved, both to itself with respect to 
appropriations, and to agencies' conduct, by the 
discretionary function exception from the F.T.C.A.'s 
[or the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's] consent to 
suit. . . . Without question, a weather service [or a 
corrections system] constitutes such, and to say that 
the very exercise of the function justifies reliance 
and a right to expect complete care would make the 
discretionary exception self-destructive. 
Id. 
Finally, the Brown court expressed the basic inquiry called 
for by Varig, and similar language permeates this Court's 
decisions in Epting, Emery and Sheffield: 
We add that, from the standpoint of the government, 
the Weather Service [or corrections] is a particularly 
unfortunate area in which to establish a duty of judi-
cially reviewable due care. A weather forecast [or 
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predicting criminal behavior] is a classic example of 
a prediction of indeterminate reliability, and a place 
peculiarly open to debatable decisions, including the 
desirable degree of investment of government funds and 
other resources. Weather predictions [and rehabilita-
tion of criminals] fail on frequent occasions. If in 
only a small proportion parties suffering in conse-
quence succeeded in producing an expert who could 
persuade a judge [or jury] that the government should 
have done better, the burden on the fisc would be both 
unlimited and intolerable. . . . [A]s the court said 
in Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2768[:] "Judicial 
intervention in such decision-making through private 
tort suits would require the courts to 'second-guess' 
the political, social, and economic judgments of an 
agency exercising its regulatory function. It was 
precisely this sort of judicial intervention in 
policy-making that the discretionary function excep-
tion was designed to prevent." 
790 F.2d at 204. 
The Brown court saw through the artificial semantics of the 
pre-Varig interpretation of discretionary function, and the 
decision would serve well as a model for this Court to follow 
in the instant case. Failing to follow the lead of Brown and 
the other post-Varig federal cases will result in this Court 
reading "the discretionary function exception right out by 
finding it does not apply at precisely the place to which it is 
particularly directed." Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. 
The primary significance of the post-Varig federal cases is 
that the courts now apply the discretionary function exception 
to bar claims for damages allegedly caused by lower level 
government employees who exercised judgment and implemented 
policy. The federal courts are now using the two tests from 
Varig, or the express language of Dalehite, and have discarded 
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the planning level-operational level approach of pre-Varig 
federal case law. The current federal case law interpreting 
the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims 
Act now bears no resemblance to that relied upon by this Court 
in Frank v. State, Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam. Serv., or 
in Doe v. Arguelles. 
4. Doe v. Arguelles Is Inconsistent with Federal 
Case Law Interpretation of the Discretionary 
Function Exception. 
Appellant relies on Doe v. Arguelles,1l for the proposi-
tion that the discretionary function exception does not apply 
here and that there is no immunity. This Court's holding in 
Arguelles, however, is not nearly as broad as appellant 
claims. In Arguelles, this Court declared: 
It is widely held that the decision to release, 
parole, or put on probation criminal defendants, 
i i The facts of Doe v. Arguelles are as follows: 
Arguelles was a juvenile placed in the State Youth 
Development Center (the "YDC") with a history of sexual 
violence. On December 19, 1979, Arguelles was released 
from the YDC into the community. His release was approved 
by YDC Director Ronald Stromberg. On March 6, 1980, 
Arguelles assaulted the 14-year-old ward of plaintiff. 
Stromberg's decision to release Arguelles was based, at 
least in part, on the fact that certain conditions and 
requirements were attached to the release, e.g., weekly 
meetings between Arguelles and a counselor. Thus, 
Stromberg not only made the decisions to release and to 
place conditions on the release, but also, according to 
the Court's conclusions, personally was responsible for 
implementing and monitoring the release and the conditions 
of release. 
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juvenile defendants, or mental patients is a decision 
of a judgment, planning, or policy nature. . . . It 
accordingly follows that Stromberg's decision to place 
Arguelles fell into the category of functions designed 
to be shielded under the discretionary function excep-
tion, and his decision should not be questioned in a 
court of law. 
25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. 
According to Arguelles, then, appellant here has no claim 
based on any alleged negligence relating to the decision to 
transfer Kenneth Roberts from the state prison to the Ogden 
halfway house. According to Arguelles, the only actionable 
activities would be those occurring after the transfer, where, 
allegedly, corrections officials negligently supervised 
Roberts. See id. at 12. Thus, according to Arguelles, the 
discretionary function exception bars any claim against 
respondent William Milliken, who, as Director of the Division 
of Corrections, may have been indirectly involved with the 
decision to transfer, but who, according to the undisputed 
facts, had absolutely no involvement in the supervision of 
Roberts after his transfer. Likewise, appellant has no claim 
against respondent Leon Hatch, who, as Deputy Warden, was 
directly involved in the decision to transfer Roberts to the 
halfway house but was not involved in any way with the 
supervision of Roberts after he arrived at the halfway house. 
Arguelles restricts the issues here to only the acts or 
failure to act of respondent Weldon Morgan, the Director of the 
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Ogden halfway house, who was responsible for supervising 
Roberts. All other acts of which appellant complains deal 
directly and intimately with the decision to transfer Roberts 
and are protected by the holding in Arguelles. If Arguelles 
stands for anything it stands for the proposition that a deci-
sion to release or transfer a prison inmate is discretionary. 
The dilemma this Court must resolve, then, is the striking 
inconsistency which has developed between the federal case law 
interpretation of the discretionary function exception after 
Varig and this Court's interpretation of the exception in Doe 
v. Arguelles, particularly as that exception applies to those 
decisions and actions of respondent Weldon Morgan occurring 
after Roberts was transferred to the Ogden halfway house. 
Frank v. State, supra, acknowledged that federal case law 
interpreting the discretionary function exception of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)) was the standard 
followed by the Utah Court in cases previous to Frank: 
In this regard, this Court has followed the lead of 
cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act by 
distinguishing between those decisions occurring at a 
broad, policy-making level and those taking place at 
the implementing "operational" level. 
612 P.2d at 519. Citing Carroll v. State Road Comm'n as an 
example of the Court's adoption of the planning level-opera-
tional level approach of the federal courts, the Court used 
that approach to decide the issues in Frank. See also Bigelow 
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v. Inqersoll, 618 P.2d at 53-54. This well-established 
precedent was re-emphasized in Little v. Utah State Div. of 
Farm Serv., supra, where Justice Howe observed: 
Utah's exceptions to waiver of governmental immunity 
closely parallel those enumerated under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This Court 
has followed the lead of cases interpreting that act. 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). Beginning 
with the two root cases of Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 61, 73, S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953) and 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 
S. Ct. 122, 100 L. Ed. 48 (1955), the lines in federal 
cases have been consistently drawn between those func-
tions ascribable to policy making level and those to 
the operational level. 
667 P.2d at 51. 
This Court reached the logical, albeit radical, ultimate 
extension of the planning level-operational level approach to 
application of the discretionary function exception in Doe v. 
Arguelles. There, the Court held: 
Because a probation officer's policy decisions are 
discretionary, he is immune from suit arising from 
those decisions. However, his acts implementing the 
policy must be considered on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether they are ministerial and thereby 
outside the immunity protections . . . 
. . . If it can be shown at trial that the 
injury to plaintiff's ward was proximately caused by 
Stromberg's omissions, it . . . result[ed] from . . . 
his negligence in monitoring the prescribed treatment 
after making the discretionary decision to do so. 
25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (emphasis added). 
Arguelles thus grants discretionary immunity to decisions 
made at the policy making or planning level, but denies 
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immunity to acts implementing those very same decisions—even 
though in Arguelles it was the same person who made the deci-
sion and then acted to implement it. Arguelles has effectively 
written the discretionary function exception right out of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, which is exactly where the planning 
level-operational level dichotomy approach ultimately leads. 
No decision or policy, left alone, ever caused any damage 
or injury, or, for that matter, any real benefit. It is only 
through actual implementation that a decision or policy can 
further legitimate governmental goals or sometimes, unfortu-
nately, cause harm. By declaring that the thought processes 
used in making a decision are discretionary, but that acts 
implementing that decision are not, Arguelles destroys the 
protection intended by the discretionary function exception. 
All a plaintiff need do is allege negligent implementation of a 
policy decision - for, obviously, if plaintiff was injured, 
then there must have been an act or omission, and thus "imple-
mentation"—and no such claim can ever again be barred. 
Arguelles may even eliminate discretionary protection of a 
non-implemented decision. The negligent implementation of a 
decision would, of course, include failure to implement where 
implementation should have occurred. Even though a govern-
mental official may decide upon a policy, but decide not to 
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implement it, perhaps in part to avoid the liability that could 
attach under Arguelles, he nevertheless subjects himself to 
liability by not acting where possibly he should have acted. 
In any event, according to Arguelles, his failure to implement 
becomes an issue of fact. In the classic "Catch-22," the 
official becomes liable if he acts or if he doesn't act. 
It is here that the inherent fundamental flaws of the plan-
ning level-operational level approach become most evident. It 
will not take long for government officials to learn that if 
liability attaches both for implementing decisions and for not 
implementing decisions, it is the decision itself that triggers 
liability. The ultimate extension of the pre-Varig approach to 
discretionary function then, as evidenced by Arguelles, makes 
the decision-making process the source of "case-by-case" con-
sideration to determine whether there is negligence. The plan-
ning level-operational level approach in Arguelles thus 
effectively eliminates application of the Governmental Immunity 
Act's discretionary function exception.12 
It is for these reasons that, just as post-Varig federal 
courts have re-evaluated their pre-Varig decisions, this Court 
Thus, the Arguelles Court "judicially admit[ted] at 
the back door that which has been legislatively turned 
away at the front door," Bradley v. United States, 615 
F. Supp. 206, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1985), and, by judicial fiat, 
amended the governmental Immunity Act by effectively 
deleting Section 63-30-10(1)(a) . 
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needs to re-evaluate Arguelles. By doing so, this Court will 
come to apply the Varig test to the undisputed facts of this 
case, determine that the actions of the corrections officials 
involved in this case are protected by the discretionary 
function exception, reaffirm Epting (just as Varig reaffirmed 
Dalehite), and ensure that the Governmental Immunity Act's 
discretionary function exception be given its intended effect. 
To do otherwise would reguire this Court to do one or more 
of the following: (a) expressly overrule Epting, Emery and 
Sheffield; (b) repudiate the Court's decade-long adherence to 
the precedent of following the lead of federal case law inter-
pretation of the discretionary function exception, and thereby 
explicitly reverse portions of Frank and Little; (c) disregard 
the unanimous United States Supreme Court opinion in Varig and 
the subseguent case law development in the federal courts; 
(d) intentionally preserve the same type of artificial and 
conclusory dichotomy approach this Court earlier rejected in 
Standiford and Johnson; and (e) by judicial fiat, write the 
discretionary function exception out of the Governmental 
Immunity Act by effectively eliminating any meaningful applica-
tion of that exception. 
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POINT II 
BOTH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND 
COMMON LAW BAR APPELLANT'S CLAIMS FOR GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL RESPON-
DENTS . 
A. Representative Capacity. 
Where a governmental entity is immune from suit, its 
employees, acting in their representative capacities, are like-
wise immune from suit. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 632; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3) and (4). As ruled by the District 
Court below, and supported by the legal authorities set forth 
at length above, appellant's claims against respondent State of 
Utah are barred by governmental immunity. According to the law 
in Utah, as set forth unequivocally in statute and by this 
Court in Madsen, appellant has no cause of action against 
respondents William Milliken, Leon Hatch and Weldon Morgan in 
their representative capacities as employees of the State of 
Utah. The District Court's summary judgment to that effect 
must be affirmed. 
B. Personal Capacity. 
1. Common Law Is Applicable Here. 
In 1978, the Utah Legislature amended Section 
63-30-4 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by adding two 
major paragraphs establishing the Act's express waivers of 
immunity as the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by entity 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment. 
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See 1978 Utah Laws Ch. 27 § 3. In the January 28, 1983 case of 
Madsen v. Borthick, supra, this Court interpreted this 1978 
amendment to be an expression of legislative intent to elimi-
nate any and all common law remedies against government enti-
ties and employees not otherwise expressed within the Act. See 
658 P.2d at 633. The Court also held that the 1978 amendment 
indicated legislative intent to substitute the statutory 
immunity standards of the Act for any and all defenses that 
might have been asserted under common law, including, but not 
necessarily limited to, common law official immunity. Id. 
At the legislative session held within weeks of the release 
of the Madsen opinion, the Utah Legislature added another sub-
section to Section 63-3C-4 of the Act. See 1983 Utah Laws Ch. 
129 § 3. By that amendment, the Legislature clarified its 
intent that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act generally, and 
the 1978 amendments to Section 63-30-4 specifically, not be 
interpreted to eliminate any defenses that might be asserted by 
a government entity or employee under state or federal common 
law.13 Id. 
The 1983 amendment also re-emphasized what had been 
clarified by the amendments in 1978 -- that the provisions 
of the Act apply to government employees as well as their 
entity employers. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(2). In 
her brief, appellant cites three pre-1980 decisions of 
this Court in support of her argument that the Act does 
not apply to individuals. Such argument directly con-
tradicts the 1978 and 1983 amendments, and is contrary to 
Madsen v. Borthick, supra, and, therefore, should be 
disregarded. 
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This Court cannot ignore the clear expression of legis-
lative intent in that 1983 amendment, passed immediately after 
the Madsen decision. The new subsection 63-30-4(2) did not 
create any new law or affect any substantive or vested right. 
It was no more than a clear message to the courts of this state 
that the Legislature never intended the Governmental Immunity 
Act to eliminate or otherwise affect adversely any defense that 
an entity or its employee might assert under common law. This 
amendment is clearly consistent with the overall framework of 
the Act, which codifies the common law of sovereign immunity as 
the presumption in any suit for injury resulting from the 
exercise of a governmental function. The codification allows 
an injured party to sue the government or its employee only 
under the conditions and circumstances expressly enumerated. 
In other words, immunity is the rule and remedies are the 
exception. The 1983 amendment adding subsection (2) to Section 
63-30-4 merely clarified that subsections 63-30-4(3) and (4) 
eliminate all common law remedies, substituting therefore the 
exclusive remedies of the Act, but do not affect applicable 
common law defenses.14 
1 4 Thus, the Madsen analysis concluding that the Act 
eliminates application of all common law, both defenses 
and remedies, must be modified slightly. The Act elimi-
nates only common law remedies; common law defenses may 
still be asserted to eliminate causes of action or bar 
recovery. With this modification, Madsen remains a 
valuable development of governmental immunity law in Utah, 
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According to Frank v. State, supra, where an amendment is 
an "obvious manifestation" of legislative intent to clarify 
interpretation of the statute it amends, the amendment should 
be applied retroactively. 613 P.2d at 519. The manifestation 
is obvious here. The Legislature amended the Act as soon as 
possible after it perceived that this Court in Madsen had 
interpreted the Act in a way inconsistent with the Legisla-
ture's original intent. 
Frank is controlling here and subsection (2) of Section 
63-30-4 applies to this case,15 and respondents may properly 
assert any applicable common law defenses. 
2. Common Law Official Immunity Bars Appellant's 
Claims Against Respondents In Their Personal 
Capacities. 
Prior to Madsen v. Borthick, this Court recognized and 
applied the common law defense of official immunity. As stated 
by Justice Crockett in Sheffield v. Turner, supra, and in 
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d at 928 (Crockett, J., concurring), 
and reiterated in Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 
715, 721 (Utah 1982), official immunity barred any action 
In Doe v. Arguelles, 25 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12, this 
Court erroneously stated that subsection (2) of Section 
63-30-4 was added by amendment in 1978. As noted herein, 
subsection (2) was added in 1983. Compare 1983 Utah Laws 
Ch. 129 § 3 with 1978 Utah Laws Ch. 27 § 3. Nevertheless, 
pursuant to Frank v. State, this Court properly applied 
the 1983 amendment retroactively to the pre-1983 facts in 
Arguelles. 
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against a governmental officer or employee for injury allegedly 
resulting from that employee's good faith execution of his 
legally authorized discretionary duties insofar as the employee 
was not guilty of any intentional or willful wrongdoing. 
As recently as October of 1984, this Court cited favorably 
to Sutro, and held that, with respect to common law official 
immunity, "[a] discretionary duty is one that requires the 
exercise of judgment or requires choice of alternatives in its 
performance." Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984). 
This 1984 definition of discretionary performance for purposes 
of common law official immunity reiterates the position adopted 
by this Court in Sheffield and Sutro.* 6 
The District Court below properly held that the State of 
Utah was immune from suit by virtue of the discretionary 
Not until Doe v. Arguelles was decided in December of 
1985, did this Court apply the planning level-operational 
level approach to common law official immunity. Prior to 
Arguelles, this Court applied at least two distinct stan-
dards for discretionary acts of government officials: (1) 
the planning level-operational level approach of Frank, 
Bigelow, et al., for application of the statutory discre-
tionary function waiver of the Act; and (2) the exercise 
of judgment/alternate choices analysis of Sheffield, Sutro 
and Snyder, for application in common law official immu-
nity cases. Without acknowledging the separate theories, 
Arguelles commingled the two and seems to have eliminated 
the Sheffield/Sutro/Snyder common law analysis without 
comment. 
(continued) 
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function exception to the waiver of immunity; the discretionary 
acts which formed the basis of the lower court's decision were 
undertaken by none other than respondents Milliken, Hatch and 
Morgan. If the State is immune by virtue of the discretionary 
function exception, then, as a matter of law, the acts of these 
respondents were discretionary, requiring "the exercise of 
judgment" and the "choice of alternatives" in the performance 
of those acts. Snyder, 693 P.2d at 65. This Court in 
Sheffield succinctly stated the dispositive legal principle 
applicable here: 
[T]he warden and other prison officers are protected 
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims 
of negligence so long as they are acting in good faith 
and within the scope of their duties . . . [. T]hey 
could not be held liable unless they were guilty of 
some conduct which transcended the bounds of good 
faith performance of their duty by a willful or mali-
cious wrongful act which they know or should know 
would result in injury. 
Sheffield, 445 P.2d at 369 (footnote omitted). 
(Continued) 
Elsewhere in this brief, respondents set forth in 
detail the misapplication of the statutory discretionary 
function in Arquelles. The recent developments in the 
federal courts following Varig suggests that the two dis-
tinct approaches used by this Court prior to Arguelles can 
be harmonized, but the harmony must come from adoption by 
this Court of the Dalehite/Varig Airlines analysis, rather 
than a perpetuation of Arguelles. 
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The Court in Epting reviewed in detail the balancing of 
interests and the exercise of judgment that go hand-in-hand 
with the administration of penal institutions and the attempted 
rehabilitation of adjudicated criminals. Epting, 546 P.2d at 
244. Numerous courts from other jurisdictions have discussed 
the inherent risks involved in corrections policies and pro-
grams, and how corrections officials daily are faced with mak-
ing decisions and implementing programs that inherently require 
allocation of those risks. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 
27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980); Caril 
v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Adamov v. State, 46 Ohio 
Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1975); Evangelical United 
Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 
(1965). 
The common law defense of official immunity, as defined by 
this Court in Sheffield, Sutro and Snyder attaches to the 
discretionary acts of respondents Milliken, Hatch and Morgan, 
and bars appellant's claims against them in their individual 
capacities. There is no evidence of willful or intentional 
wrongdoing which would preclude application of this common law 
immunity, and the District Court's ruling with respect to the 
personal liability of the individual respondents was error. 
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3. The Governmental Immunity Act Bars Appellant's 
Claims Against Respondents In Their Personal 
Capacities. 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature amended Section 63-30-4 of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by adding subsection (2), as 
discussed in detail above, and by deleting the term "gross 
negligence" from subsections (3) and (4). The District Court's 
ruling below, which denied summary judgment on the issue of the 
individual state respondents' alleged gross negligence, was 
based on the inclusion of "gross negligence" in the exclusive 
statutory remedy of subsections (3) and (4). See Memorandum 
Decision at 18-19, Record on Appeal at 900-901; copy of Memo-
randum Decision attached hereto as Appendix "B." As a matter 
of law, either (a) appellant's cause of action against respon-
dents did not accrue until after the effective date of the 
deletion of "gross negligence" from the Act by amendment, or 
(b) the amendment should be applied retroactively to implement 
an obvious manifestation of legislative intent to clarify the 
Act's application and interpretation. In either case, based on 
Section 63-30-4 of the Act, appellant has no cause of action 
against respondents Milliken, Hatch and Morgan for gross 
negligence. 
(a) Appellant's Cause of Action Did Not Accrue 
Until After the Effective Date of the 1983 
Amendment Deleting Gross Negligence. 
As discussed in detail above, subsection (3) and (4) of 
Section 63-30-4 sets forth the exclusivity of the remedies 
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available to an injured party wishing to sue a government 
entity or its employees. The remedy is statutory; it did not 
exist at common law, which barred all claims against the 
sovereign and its sovereign agents. See generally Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629. Appellant's cause of action thus is 
a creation of statute. The conditions set forth in the statute 
limiting or circumscribing the remedies available to appellant 
are conditions precedent which must be satisfied before the 
action can be maintained in a court of law. Cornwall v. 
Larsen, 571 P.2d at 926; Madsen v. Borthick, supra. 
The Governmental Immunity Act requires that before an 
injured party can seek a remedy in the courts (for injury 
arising out of the exercise of a governmental function), the 
injured party must file a notice of claim with the entity and 
wait until that claim is expressly denied or ninety (90) days 
expires from the the time notice was given, whichever occurs 
first. The injured party has no cause of action in court to 
remedy his injury until these notice conditions are satisfied. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 through -15. 
It is the law in Utah that a cause of action "accrues at 
the time it becomes remedial in the courts, that is when the 
claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give 
judgment if the claim is established." State Tax Comm'n v. 
Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, 577 (1940). In the 
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case at bar, according to Utah law, appellant's claim against 
respondents did not accrue until it could be remedied "in the 
courts." Id. 
Appellant was assaulted by Kenneth Roberts on December 24, 
1982. She filed two notices of claim with the State of Utah. 
The first was filed on January 11, 1983, but did not name any 
of the individual respondents, and was a civil rights claim for 
deprivation of rights, representing to the State that a civil 
rights action would be filed in federal court. See Notice of 
Intent to Sue and Claim, Record on Appeal at 869-70, copy 
attached hereto as Appendix "C." Appellant then filed an 
Amended Notice of Claim on March 8, 1983, naming respondent 
William Milliken and several "John Does," in addition to 
respondent State of Utah. This second notice of claim put the 
state and respondent Milliken on notice that appellant was 
claiming negligence and gross negligence, and would be suing in 
state court if the claim were denied. See Amended Notice of 
Claim and Intent to Sue, Record on Appeal at 872, copy attached 
hereto as Appendix "D." The second notice filed on March 8 
triggered the ninety (90) day statutory waiting period. The 
State did not expressly deny appellant's claim, so appellant 
could file an action in the District Court no sooner than 
June 8, 1983, ninety (90) days after she had filed her notice 
of claim. Until that date in June, appellant had no right to 
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any remedy in any court in the State.17 Thus, her cause of 
action against the State and its employees did not accrue until 
June 8, 1983. 
It is also the general rule in Utah that "the facts and the 
law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the 
filing of the original complaint." Archer v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, 624 (1964). Appellant's 
original complaint was not filed until December 6, 1983, see 
Appellant's Complaint, Record on Appeal, at 17, but in any 
event could not have been filed before June 8, 1983, 
ninety (90) days after she filed her notice of claim. 
The amendments to Section 63-30-4 became effective law as 
of May 10, 1983. See 1983 Utah Laws Ch. 129. The effective 
date of the amendment deleting gross negligence from the 
statute thus occurred well before the accrual of appellant's 
The Governmental Immunity Act precludes application of 
regular tort law principles for accrual of causes of 
action. On December 24, 1982, appellant could have filed 
an action against Roberts for the assault, and regular 
tort principles would apply to such a suit. But where 
appellant seeks a remedy against the State and its 
employees, she could not find a remedy in the courts on 
December 24, 1982. The Legislature, by passage of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, created the remedy sought by 
appellant and circumscribed its availability. "[T]he 
general rule is that the Legislature may attach its own 
conditions to an exercise of the rights granted [by 
statute]." Montgomery v. Polk County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 915 
(Iowa 1979). 
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cause of action on June 8, 1983. Thus, as of the time appel-
lant could seek remedy from the courts, her remedy against the 
individual respondents in their personal capacities was limited 
to fraud or malice only. She therefore has no cause of action 
for gross negligence, and there being no claim of fraud or 
malice, nor any evidence to support same, her Amended Complaint 
should be dismissed. 
(b) The 1983 Amendment Deleting Gross Negligence 
Should Be Applied Retroactively. 
As explained above, the legislature amended Section 63-30-4 
of the Act within weeks of this Court's interpretation of that 
section in Madsen v. Borthick. The amendments did two things: 
(1) consistent with a portion of the Madsen opinion, the 
amendments clarified legislative intent that the Act displaced 
common law remedies, but made it clear that the Act was 
intended to preserve all applicable common law defenses; and 
(2) consistent with the common law defense of official immu-
nity, which the Legislature manifestly intended to preserve, 
the Legislature deleted the term "gross negligence" from the 
statute, leaving fraud and malice — both willful and inten-
tional wrongs — as the exclusive remedies against a government 
employee in his personal capacity. 
The elimination of "gross negligence" conformed the statute 
to Utah case law authority defining common law official immu-
nity. See Cornwall v. Larsen, supra, and Utah State Univ. v. 
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Sutro & Co., supra. The legislative response to Madsen was 
quick and clear. The Court not only had interpreted the 
statute's exclusive remedy provisions differently than the 
Legislature had originally intended, but also eliminated common 
law official immunity, which the Legislature had intended to 
preserve. According to Frank v. State, supra, an amendment of 
this kind should be applied retroactively by the courts in 
order to implement the clear legislative manifestation of 
intent. 
The District Court below rejected this argument, ruling 
that retroactive application would divest appellant of a vested 
right to a cause of action for gross negligence. See Memoran-
dum Decision, supra, at 22. In doing so, the District Court 
erroneously applied regular tort law principles affecting 
accrual of causes of action to a statutorily created remedy 
circumscribed by express statutory conditions. That statutory 
scheme creates a cause of action not affected by regular tort 
principles of accrual. The lower court ruled that since appel-
lant was injured on December 24, 1982, the law in effect on 
December 24, 1982 was the law of the case. Obviously, if 
appellant were suing a private individual or corporation, she 
might have filed a complaint on the day she was injured and the 
District Court's conclusion would then be correct. Appellant's 
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desire to seek remedy from a government entity and its 
employees, however, involves different rules of accrual. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed vested rights in 
connection with actions against a governmental entity or its 
employees. Numerous states have, however, and the vast major-
ity hold that the vested right analysis is inappropriate where 
the right to sue is granted only by consent of the government 
under specific statutory conditions. 
The California Court of Appeal has declared: 
[I]t is clear that the scheme for suing the government 
in California is based upon waiver of immunity from 
legal action. This scheme was not designed to create 
an independent source of substantive liability. . . . 
Moreover, the constitutional authority empowering the 
Legislature to control the manner in which the govern-
ment is sued . . ., has been construed as a consent tc 
be sued, not an independent basis on which to hold the 
government liable. . . . In short, since a government 
entity in California may be sued only by virtue of 
consent, the vested right analysis . . . is manifestly 
inappropriate. 
Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 2d 
575, 121 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (emphasis 
added). The Superior Court of New Jersey likewise held that 
the vested right "formulation" is 
a misconception of the effect of the [governmental 
tort immunity] statute. It does not bar a cause of 
action; its effect, rather is to prevent what might 
otherwise be a cause of action, from ever 
arising. . . . The injured party literally has no 
cause of action. 
Perillo v. Dreher, 126 N.J. Super. 264, 314 A.2d 74, 77 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1974) (emphasis in original). 
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Similar rulings have been made by the Supreme Courts of 
Kansas, Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan, 597, 438 P.2d 135, 142 
(1968) ("It is the law of this state that a statute which 
merely changes a remedy is not invalid, as there are no vested 
rights in any particular remedy."), Colorado, Jefferson County 
Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. D.A.G., 199 Colo. 315, 607 P.2d 1004, 
1006 (1980) (no such thing as a vested right in remedies), and 
Washington, Hansen v. West Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wash. 
2d 825, 289 P.2d 718, 720 (1955) ("Where a tort action can be 
brought only by virtue of a statute, there can be no vested 
right therein, and the Legislature may take away the right at 
any time." (emphasis in original)). See also Fussner v. 
Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); White v. State, 
661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 
297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969). 
Thus, the District Court's ruling below in the instant 
case, that appellant had a vested right as of December 24, 1982 
in a cause of action for gross negligence against the state 
employees in their individual capacities, is contrary to law. 
No such vested right existed. Accordingly, retroactive appli-
cation of the 1983 amendment eliminating gross negligence will 
not enlarge, eliminate or destroy any vested right, and is, 
therefore, appropriate. See generally Pilcher v. State Dept. 
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of Soc. Serv., 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); State Dept. of 
Soc. Serv. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SIMPLE 
NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL RESPON-
DENTS MILLIKEN, HATCH AND MORGAN. 
By interlocutory appeal, appellant challenges the District 
Court's holding that she cannot sue the individual respondents 
in their non-representative, individual capacities for simple 
negligence. The District Court's ruling, however, is consis-
tent with Doe v. Arguelles, which restated well-established 
law: "the legislature has mandated . . . that no employee may 
be held liable unless it is established that his act or 
omission constituted gross negligence." Id., at 12 (footnote 
omitted). 
The Governmental Immunity Act section referred to by the 
Arguelles Court (Section 63-30-4) establishes the provisions of 
the Act as the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity 
or employee for any injury allegedly caused by the exercise of 
a governmental function. Only where the Act does not apply can 
a plaintiff bring a cause of action other than those specifi-
cally enumerated within the Act. Neither Section 63-30-4, nor 
any other section of the Act provides a remedy against a 
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governmental employee for injury caused by the simple negli-
gence of that employee.18 
Appellant's argument that the Act's insurance provisions in 
some fashion require personal liability of employees for simple 
negligence ignores not only the entire concept of the Act but 
specific provisions thereof as well. The argument is little 
more than a non-sequitor. 
Appellant also relies on Madsen v. Borthick, supra, as 
support foe the argument that simple negligence is actionable, 
even though she concedes that the Madsen facts are "unlike" the 
facts of this case. See Brief of Appellant, at 79. Appellant 
purposefully avoids the Court's holding in Madsen, opting 
instead to refer this Court to passages from one of the briefs 
filed in the Madsen case. If, as appellant asserts, the Madsen 
holding is not applicable, then arguments asserted by one of 
the Madsen parties in an appeal brief certainly do not apply 
here and need not be considered. 
The applicable statute (Section 63-30-4) is unambiguous and 
clear. The holding in Madsen, 658 P.2d at 632-33, reaffirmed 
Appellant does not here challenge application of the 
Act. The actions complained of are governmental functions 
and, pursuant to Section 63-30-3 of the Act, the provi-
sions of the Act apply. 
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by Arguelles, is no less clear. As a matter of law, appellant 
has no cause of action for simple negligence against any of the 
individual respondents. 
POINT IV 
THE MAXIM OF DELEGATUS NON POTEST DELEGARE 
IS NOT APPLICABLE HERE. 
Appellant argues that the Prison Warden, Kenneth Shulsen, 
had a non-delegable statutory duty to authorize personally the 
transfer of Kenneth Roberts from the prison to the Ogden 
halfway house facility, and that his failure to be personally 
involved is an actionable breach of that duty. Appellant bases 
this argument on an ancient Latin maxim, delegatus non potest 
delegare, which, as a generality, states that delegated power 
may not be delegated further by the delegatee to whom such 
power is delegated. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution 
Control Bd., 25 111. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (111. Ct. App. 
1975). Citing Section 64-13-11 which provides that M[t]he 
warden may transfer any inmate from one correctional facility 
or custody level to another," and arguing application of the 
Latin maxim, appellant contends that the warden must be 
personally involved in each and every internal prison trans-
fer or custody level change involving each of the more than 
1,900 inmates at the prison. 
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Ignoring the most obvious flaw in this argument, that 
appellant has never made claim against the warden, the argument 
fails for several reasons. First, the Utah Code provisions 
dealing with interpretation and construction of statutory 
language specifically declare: 
"Sheriff," "county attorney," "clerk," or other 
words used to denote an executive or ministerial 
officer, may include any deputy, or other person 
performing the duties of such officers, either 
generally or in special cases. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(17) (emphasis added). See also id. 
§ 68-3-2 (statutes in derogation of common law to be liberally 
construed). By statutory provision, the use of the term 
"warden" in Section 64-13-11 may include "any deputy, or other 
person performing the duties" of the warden. 
Simply put, the statute relied upon by appellant (Section 
64-13-11), interpreted liberally in light of Sections 68-3-2 
and 68-3-12(17), does not restrict the warden's powers as 
appellant suggests. Rather, where a deputy warden,19 acting 
on behalf of the warden and with his knowledge and consent, 
implements a statutorily authorized intra-system transfer of an 
1 9 In this instance, the Deputy Warden was respondent 
Leon Hatch. As Chairman of the Prison Administrative 
Review Board, Hatch made the final decision approving 
Kenneth Roberts* classification change and transfer to the 
Ogden halfway house. Warden Kenneth Shulsen had delegated 
that assignment to Hatch, making him responsible for the 
management of all housing and custody programs. See 
Deposition of Kenneth Shulsen, at 6-11. 
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inmate, he does so as the alter-ego of the warden, and the 
transfer is valid and lawful. See State v. Aherns, 25 Utah 2d 
222, 479 P.2d 786, 787 (1971). See also Poucher v. State, 46 
Ala. App. 272, 240 So.2d 694 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970). 
Secondly, such transfer, whether accomplished by the 
warden or his deputy, is just as appellant describes it in her 
brief -- an exercise of discretion and quasi-judicial in char-
acter. See Brief of Appellant, at 69. While appellant tries 
to limit this discretion to the decision to transfer, thus 
eliminating discretion from the actual implementation of the 
transfer (as per Arguelles), appellant ignores the very 
language of the statute upon which she relies, which says "the 
warden may transfer," and not "the warden may only decide to 
transfer." 
The term "may transfer" as used here, is obviously intended 
as discretionary, not mandatory, see Purcell v. Wilkins, 57 Utah 
467, 195 P. 547 (1921), and the discretion intended by the 
Legislature clearly deals expressly with the actual transfer. 
The statute does not limit the discretion only to the decision 
to transfer, or to the decision-making procedure which may 
ultimately lead to transfer, nor does the statute exclude the 
implementation of the transfer. Rather, discretion attaches to 
the actual implementation of the transfer, as well as to the 
policy-level decisions preceding the transfer. 
Where the Legislature expressly states that the warden (or 
his deputy) "may transfer any inmate," this Court cannot 
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justifiably interpret that clear grant of discretionary author-
ity in any way other than what it says. There is no rational 
way, under any recognized principle of statutory construction, 
for this Court to interpret "may transfer" to mean: "discre-
tion to decide to transfer, but once the decision is made to 
transfer, there is no discretion to implement that decision or 
to actually transfer the inmate." 
Last, but not least, the maxim which appellant wishes to 
apply here is simply impractical and inappropriate in modern 
day society. A strict application of the maxim would bring the 
operation of government to a grinding halt. Clearly, the 
administrative aspects of running an overcrowded prison, 
including the coordination of corrections programs, overseeing 
inmates, and supervising hundreds of employees, simply do not 
conform to ancient Latin maxims.20 
Numerous appellate courts have considered this maxim 
and found that it either has lost its force as a result of 
the impact of management problems in complex business and 
government operations, Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del. 
Ch. 318, 116 A.2d 893 (1955), or that the legal principle 
espoused must be adapted to and its application restricted 
by the present-day concepts of government, City of Bayonne 
v. Palmer, 90 N.J. Super. 245, 217 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1966). See also Warren County v. Judges of 
the Fifth Judicial Dist., 243 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1976) 
(recognizing "modern tendency toward greater liberality" 
in application "as the complexity of governmental and 
economic conditions increase"); Ruggeri v. City of St. 
Louis, 441 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1969) (recognizing Mtliberal 
trend1 or even inapplicability of the doctrine"). 
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POINT V 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, RESPONDENTS OWED NO DUTY 
TO APPELLANT. 
The argument hereinabove set forth renders the issue of 
legal duty moot. Nevertheless, because the Court below ruled 
that a legal, actionable duty extended from the State respon-
dents to appellant, the issue will be addressed briefly here to 
show the Court's error. 
In order for appellant to recover against these respondents 
she must show that she had a special relationship with these 
respondents which would impose a duty greater than the general 
duty owed by respondents to the public at large. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered fac-
tual circumstances similar to this case in Humann v. Wilson, 
696 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1983), and recognized that the 
plaintiff there "did not stand in any special relationship to 
the parolee from which the parole officers might have inferred 
a special danger to her." Id., at 784. This requirement that a 
"special relationship" exist between plaintiff and defendant 
before an actionable duty arises is an expression of the 
"public duty" rule. This rule requires that appellant "must 
show the breach of a duty owed to [her] as an individual, and 
not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general 
public." 18 McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 
§ 53.046 at 165 (3rd Ed. 1971). 
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The "public duty" rule is the law in Utah. In Obray v. 
Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), the Cache County 
Sheriff was sued for alleged failure to investigate a burglary 
of plaintiffs store. This Court declared that the failure, if 
any, of the sheriff to investigate was "ordinarily . . . . a 
matter of judgment and discretion, not actionable or compen-
sable, and not pursuable by an individual since the public 
official's duty is to the public." 484 P.2d at 162 (footnotes 
omitted). Clearly, the same, if not greater, judgment and 
discretion are exercised by corrections officials making and 
implementing corrections decisions. Accordingly, the Obray 
public duty rule applies here. 
In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), this 
Court reached this same conclusion. There, plaintiff's dece-
dent was killed when he failed to negotiate a corner on his 
motorcycle. Moments earlier he had been stopped by sheriff's 
deputies who had reason to believe that the decedent was 
intoxicated but nevertheless only requested that the decedent 
walk his motorcycle home. Plaintiff suggested that the Utah 
Supreme Court adopt "a trend to the effect that 'public 
employees should be held liable for their tortious acts to the 
same extent as private persons.'" Ld. at 612-13. The Court 
refused, saying that to do so "would be to legislate by judi-
cial fiat." Id., at 613. Instead, the Court concluded that the 
duty of a police officer is a duty "owed to the public at 
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large." Id.. , quoting Stout v. City of Porterville, 148 Cal. 
App. 3d 937, 196 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1983). 
This general duty owed to the public at large may become a 
special duty owed to an individual, and thus one which is 
actionable by that individual, but only in circumstances where 
the government deals or acts directly with the injured party on 
an individual basis. See 18 McQuillan, supra, and cases cited 
therein. Such were the facts in Little v. Utah State Div. of 
Family Serv., supra. There, the Division of Family Services 
placed the child in a foster home, assumed a specific duty to 
provide proper care for the child, and then breached that 
specific duty. That is not the case here. No such direct 
contact took place between appellant and respondents; no 
special relationship was created, and no specific duty towards 
appellant was assumed. Even when the state assumes voluntarily 
to perform certain acts or functions, either by statute, 
regulation, or otherwise, no liability or actionable duty is 
created absent a special relationship with claimant.21 
2 1 The public duty doctrine is also the rule in a major-
ity of jurisdictions across the country. See Dinsky v. 
Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 810, 438 N.E.2d 51, 56 
(1982) (application of majority rule that in absence of 
special duty to plaintiff, different from duty owed to 
public at large, no cause of action can be maintained 
against a government entity), and cases cited therein; J & 
B Development Co., Inc. v. King County, 669 P.2d 468, 472 
(Wash. 1983) (it is necessary to decide whether there is a 
(continued) 
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See generally, Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 
1109-10 (9th Cir. 1979); Christenson v. Hayward, supra; White 
v. State, 579 P.2d 921, 923 (Utah 1978). 
The District Court below erroneously adopted the duty anal-
ysis expressed in the Arizona case of Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of 
Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977) (which held that 
individual members of the Board of Pardons could be held liable 
for their decisions regarding parole of prison inmates), and 
decisions from Montana, Hawaii, Colorado and Kansas. See Memo-
randum Decision, supra, at 25-26. The District Court, however, 
failed to take into account that each of these jurisdictions 
refuses to recognize governmental immunity, and, accordingly, 
the basic premises and concepts upon which duty is formulated 
there are entirely inconsistent with that prevailing here in 
Utah. See generally State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280 
(1926) (decisions of courts of other states under statutes 
differing from those of Utah are not controlling). In effect, 
the District Court ignored the Governmental Immunity Act 
(Continued) 
general duty to a nebulous public or whether that duty has 
focused on this particular claimant); Davidson v. City of 
Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 899, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 252 (1982) (the common theme running through cases 
in which a special relationship has been found is the 
voluntary assumption by the public entity or official of a 
specific duty toward the injured party). 
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and the basic presumptions it created and perpetuates, which 
presumptions are expressed in the decisions of Obray and 
Christenson, and judicially legislated into existence a new law 
respecting governmental duty. 
The District Court attempts to justify this creation of new 
Utah law by declaring that because the Legislature, in Section 
63-30-4, allowed causes of action against individual government 
employees for gross negligence, fraud or malice, somehow that 
shows legislative acknowledgement of an actionable duty 
extending to the general public. Id., at 27. The Court ratio-
nalized, in essence, that a statutory provision allowing suit 
creates by reference an actionable duty running to every 
injured member of the general public. The statute simply does 
not do so. SeevRingwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 
(1959) (where a statute charges one with a duty or imposes a 
burden, it must do so with sufficient clarity). It merely 
allows suit under certain enumerated conditions. If the 
statute implies anything it implies that where a duty exists 
pursuant to law, suit may then be taken against governmental 
employees under the expressed conditions. 
The law in Utah is clear. This Court must do here as it 
did in Christenson v. Hayward: (a) refuse to legislate by 
judicial fiat, as the District Court tried to do; and (b) apply 
the public duty rule. Accordingly, no actionable duty arises 
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between these respondents and appellant's claims are thereby 
barred. 
POINT VI 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE PRIN-
CIPLE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARE CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
While appellant argued below that the Governmental Immunity 
Act was unconstitutional, she has not raised this issue on 
appeal. By this omission, the issue of the Act's constitu-
tionality presumably is moot. In any event, on at least two 
separate occasions this Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of the Act, as well as the constitutionality of the legal 
doctrine of sovereign immunity codified therein. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629; Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d at 94. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the common law of 
official immunity, dispositive case law from this Court, and 
recent developments in federal case law interpreting discre-
tionary function, mandate that, as a matter of law, these 
respondents are immune from suit in this case. Under the law 
and facts of this case, to conclude that the State of Utah or 
its employees are liable for the criminal acts of Kenneth 
Roberts, would be both legally incorrect and contrary to sound 
public policy. Such a ruling: 
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1. Would emasculate express provisions of the Govern-
mental Immunity Act and result in judicial repeal or amendment 
of the Act's discretionary function exception; 
2. Would be directly contrary to prior pronouncements of 
this Court, requiring express reversal of all or part of the 
following Utah decisions: Epting v. State, Beal v. Turner, 
Sheffield v. Turner, Frank v. State, Little v. Utah State Div. 
of Fam. Serv., Madsen v. State, and Emery v. State; 
3. Would be contrary to recent federal case law develop-
ments, including the unanimous United States Supreme Court 
decision in Varig Airlines, and in direct contradiction to 
long-standing precedent in this Court to follow the lead of 
these federal cases; 
4. Would transform the government of the State of Utah 
into a "super-insurer" of the well-being of everyone who hap-
pens to be damaged or injured within its jurisdictional limits 
by someone who, at one time, entered the criminal justice or 
corrections systems of the state; 
5. Would require judicial "second-guessing" of legisla-
tive and administrative decisions and thereby take the adminis-
tration of state corrections out of the hands of corrections 
professionals to whom it has been entrusted by law; 
6. Would threaten the fiscal solvency of the State of 
Utah, either by a plethora of lawsuits for injury or damage 
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inflicted through the criminal acts of former prison inmates, 
parolees or halfway house residents, or by the massive spending 
needed to house all of those inmates through their entire terms 
of sentence, which would be required in order to prevent lia-
bility from attaching for these criminal acts committed after 
release or transfer from the prison; 
7. Would be contrary to the intent of the State Legis-
lature. 
Respondents State of Utah, William Milliken, Leon Hatch and 
Weldon Morgan are, as a matter of law, immune from suit. The 
District Court's summary judgment dismissing appellant's claims 
against the State of Utah and against Milliken, Hatch and 
Morgan in their representative capacities should therefore be 
affirmed. The District Court's denial of summary judgment as 
to appellant's claims against Milliken, Hatch and Morgan in 
their individual capacities should therefore be reversed, and, 
as a matter of law, those claims should be dismissed by this 
Court, thereby dismissing with prejudice and on the merits all 
of appellant's claims against the state respondents. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of September, 1986. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LaDAWN PRUE, 
Plaintiff, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, LEON 
HATCH, Deputy Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, WILLIAM 
MILLIKEN, Personally and as 
Director of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections, 
WELDON MORGAN, Individually 
and as Director of the Ogden 
Community Corrections Center 
FELICIA ROBERTS, and KENNETH 
ROBERTS, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO, L-83-H431 
The State of Utah and the individual defendants' Motions 
for Summary Judgment were heard 1: y 1:1: ie Court c • i 1 1 :ie • 91h day 
of August, 1985. The plaintiff was represented by George M. Haley 
and J e f f r e y Weston Shields, Esqs., and the defendants by Allan 
Larson, Bruce Jensen and Christopher Pul lei , * -
Chr istensen, Assistant Attorney General • The Court having previously 
reviewed the 325 pages of Memoranda submitted by counsel heard 
e x t e n s i v e o r a ] a r g u m e i 11 o i: :i 11 I e • :5 ifficult i s s u e s p r esented . 
The Court at the conclusion of oral argument asked for supplemental 
briefing, and took the matter under advisement for further review 
:> f t h e 1 e g a 1 a u t h o i: 11 i e s s \ i bm i 11 ed . 
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FACTS 
On December 22, 1982, defendant Kenneth Roberts ("Roberts") 
was transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community 
Correction Center, a halfway house. This transfer was to prepare 
him for an August 9, 1983 parole date. Roberts was almost imme-
diately thereafter released for a Christmas home visit with 
his wife Felicia. In the early morning hours of December 24, 
1982, while Roberts was under the influence of drugs, he brutally 
attacked and shot plaintiff LaDawn Prue near her residence inflicting 
severe and permanent injuries for which she seeks compensation 
in this proceeding. 
The plaintiff has cited this Court to over 60 pages of 
facts extracted from defendants' records or from the depositions 
taken in this proceeding. The plaintiff in sum claims that 
she will establish at trial that the defendants were "grossly 
negligent" in that they failed to comply with their own policies 
and procedures in releasing Roberts, a known repeat offender 
and poor risk, to the Ogden Community Corrections Center, and 
ultimately for home leave; and that their "gross negligence" 
caused the plaintiff's injuries. For purposes of the defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment, the facts must be taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
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ISSUES 
T h e C c • 1 i r t: :i i: i deciding the defend a n t s ' ' M :> t i c i i s f <: :i : S u m rn a r y 
Judgment must determine: (1) Whether the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is constitutional; (2) Whether the activities of 
the defendants which allegedly caused plaintiff's injuries are 
"governmental function11; (3) Whether the State has waived 
its statutory immunity from suit under S * : ^  t ion 63-30 -1 0 (] ) , 
Utah Code Ann.; (4) Whether any exception t;- the general waiver 
of immunity is applicable in this case; Whether the individual 
defendants are legally responsible ! H plaintiff -v. they 
acted or failed to act in - "grossly n e g l i g e n t manner"; (6) 
Whether the defendants owe "du./ 1 'he plaintiff and thus 
whether 11 i e i :i : acts can be. he legal s... -.-. of 11 :ie p] ain11 f f '" s 
injuries. 
Before proceeding with the legal analysis mandated by the 
defendants' Motions, the Court wishes to clarify what is not 
at issue in these proceedings. The uncontested facts of this 
case establish a grievous injury tu an innocent victim, by a 
criminal under the supervision of fh e state correctional system. 
Whether the State should be financially responsible to innocent 
victims when the State 1 : have fai ] ed t : • pi:otec 1 its 
citizens is a policy quest ic,.i. ,.,**-, policy questioi ) must be 
answered by our State legislature not this Court, The legislature 
h a s d e a 11 w i 11 i t h i s d i f f i c u 11 p o 11 c y I s s u e 1 : » y p a s s I n • g t h e I J t a h 
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Governmental Immunity Act. The State to this date does not 
have a Victim Reparation Fund although a majority of states 
have such a resource. This Court makes no statement as to the 
soundness of these policy decisions as it is beyond the power 
and duties of this Court. Although this case presents the difficult 
conflict between the State's responsibility to victims of criminals 
and the need to protect the public treasury, this Court's inquiry 
of necessity will be limited as its constitutional responsibility 
is to enforce the laws as passed by our legislature and as interpeted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A_. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has on two separate occasions found 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3, et seq., 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1983) ("Act") constitutional. Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983); Madsen v. State, 583 
P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). This Court is governed by the position 
taken by the Utah Supreme Court, and any arguments as to the 
soundness of these prior decisions must be reserved for argument 
before that Court. 
B. THE HOUSING AND REHABILITATION OF CRIMINALS IS A "GOVERN-
MENTAL FUNCTION". 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act states: 
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Except as may be o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d in t h i s 
A c t , a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s a r e immune 
from s u i t fo r any i n j u r y which r e s u l t s from 
t h e e x e r c i s e of a g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n 
• • • • 
[Emphasis added] 
The Utah Supreme C < :> i i r 1 i i i S h e f f i e l d v . T u r n e i Utah 
2d 314 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , s t a t e s : 
There can be no question but that the maintenance 
of a state prison and the keeping of prisoners 
therein is a necessary auxiliary of government 
and therefore a governmental function, nor 
that consequently the performance of the 
duties incident thereto would normally be 
protected by the traditional rule of sovereign 
immunity. 
Id. at 316. 
The Utah Supreme Court after Sheffield , supra, outlined 
a specific test to determine whether or not the activity of 
omental exercise of a "govei niPt'ii t.a I turn I iun" 
entitled to governmental immunity. Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), Johnson v. Sal t Lake 
City Corp., 6 29 . . ^ ' TQflM. Even under this 
narrowed test, because the running of a correctional system 
" es se n t i a 1 t c t he c ore o f governmental activity" it is a 
'\ tvernmental f i :n i< :1 J ; i " Standiford , a ' " f i s a "function 
which by its very nature is a unique responsibility of the state, 
and siiuuid ouj-y ue performed by the state'f i Lts desi gnated 
representative. Johnson, at 434. Since the acts complained 
of by the plaintiff arise out of the administration of the State's 
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correctional system, they are an exercise of a "governmental 
function" qualifying for the general immunity provided by Section 
63-30-3 of the Act. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS SOUND IN NEGLIGENCE AND THUS ARE 
WITHIN THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN SECTION 63-30-10(1). 
Plaintiff asserts that the State has waived immunity pursuant 
to Section 63-30-10(1): 
Immunity from suit of all government entities 
is waived for injury (1) proximately caused 
by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of his employment. 
Defendants claim that four of the causes of action of the 
plaintiff/ namely, the second, fifth, sixth and eighth claims 
for relief do not allege any circumstance for which immunity 
is waived by the Act. The gravamen of plaintiff's claims sound 
in negligence, even though the term "negligence" is not used 
in each claim. Thus the plaintiff has stated claims which qualify 
for the waiver of immunity in Section 63-30-10(1). 
The Court will deal with the defendants' arguments that 
the plaintiff's injury was not "proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee" in subsequent sections of this 
Opinion. 
D. THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH ARE EXCEPTED FROM 
THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY IN SECTION 63-30-10(1) AS THEY "ARISE 
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OUT OF THE EXERCISE O K PERFORMANCE OR THE FAILURE TO EXERCISE 
OR PERFORM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION". 
Section 63-30-10(1) enumerates particular exceptions to 
11: 1 e g e n e r a 1 w a I v e r a f i i n m i :i i 1 1 1 y f ::) r e m p ] a y e e i i e g 1 i g e n c e . T h e 
waiver and the applicable exception read as follows: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all government 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
his employment, except if the injury: (a) 
arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused. 
In Epting v. The State of Utah, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the State was immune from suit 
u n d e r 11 I e • f" :i I s a r e t i o n a r ] r f i i n c t i o i: ::t,! f e x a e p t i • :> i :i t :> 11: I e s t a t u t o r y 
waiver of immunity where a prisoner under the supervision of 
the board of corrections murdered a victim while on work release. 
The Epting court recognized the difficul ties facing prison 
authorities in developing rehabilitation programs, and applying 
those programs to particular prisoners. The court states: 
In regard to the problem: whether the placing 
of a prisoner in a work release program 
comes wi t h i n subsection (] ) above quoted 
as the the exercise. . . [of]. . . a discre-
tionary function,. . . we make the following 
observations: The prison authorities are 
faced with a dilemma which has always existed 
in penal institutions: as to what extent 
they are furnishing an education for further 
crime, or for the rehabilitation of prisoners 
into useful c i t i z e n s h i p . . But that 
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is within the discretion of the prison 
authorities to decide. In addition to the 
exercise of this judgment as to the value 
and practicability of such a program generally, 
there are problems about its advisability 
as to each individual prisoner. In order 
to weigh the positive values of possible 
benefit for him in such a program against 
the negative factors such as the likelihood 
of his escaping and engaging in more anti-social 
conduct, it is essential to consider the 
various aspects of his personality: his 
intelligence, aptitudes and qualities of 
character. . . Accordingly, we agree with 
the view of the trial court that the handling 
of the prisoner Michael Hart was something 
which "arises out of the exercise of a dis-
cretionary function" for which subsection 
(1) of section 63-30-10(1) quoted above 
has retained its sovereign immunity. 
546 P.2d at 244. 
The Court can see no distinction between the facts in Epting 
and the facts presented by this case. The adoption of a general 
program of home visits, and the decision to place an individual 
such as defendant into this status involve the same policy evalua-
tions which are required to adopt a work release program generally, 
and to place a particular prisoner in a work release program. 
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish Epting by claiming that 
although the establishment of policies and procedures concerning 
the transfer of inmates within the penal system is a discretionary 
function entitled to immunity under Epting, that once it can 
be alleged that the State has failed to follow its own policy 
and procedures, its acts are no longer a "discretionary function." 
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Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment, at- page 69. 
The Court finds tru ptaintiff's argument unpersuasive, 
as the stdtut. • ...-,. -1 spos 11 :i v*- , 11 states 1 it lat there 
is immunity not just for the "exercise or performance" of a 
discretionary function, bui tor the "failure t<» exercise or 
per for discretionary function, whether >\ nut the discretion 
is abused." Thus, although the failure of the defendants to 
follow their own policies and procedures is definitely relevant 
t negligence, this Court does not see its 
applicability the issue of immunity. 
Plaintiffs cite the recent Supreme Court ra&*> nf L1111 e 
v, Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1943) as supportive of their argument, The Court states: 
The acts complained of here are the state's 
failure to properly evaluate the home into 
which Jennifer was to be placed, failure 
to properly supervise her placement, and 
failure to protect her from harm when the 
State knew or should have known that such 
harm was likely. Assuming that the decision 
to place Jennifer in a foster home was a 
discretionary one, once that decision was 
made and the placement occurred, the question 
was no longer whether the child was to receive 
foster care, but whether due care was exercised 
under a duty assumed. Where a breach of 
that duty can be shown, the government is 
held to the same standard as private individuals, 
and cannot cloak itself with the mantle 
of discretion. 
Id. at 51 
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The language cited from Little merely restates the Supreme 
Court's continued adherence to the distinction between a ministerial 
and a policy level act. See, discussion at p. 13, infra. Other 
language of the Court in Little would support this conclusion: 
Decision of attorney general to place an 
insane prisoner in a mental institution 
and decision of parole board to release 
prisoner on parole are discretionary functions. 
Id. at 52. 
The plaintiff next argues that Epting is no longer controlling 
law in Utah as the recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
adopt a new ministerial versus policy level analysis, and that 
Epting has been overruled sub silencio . This argument is undermined 
by the case of Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 
384 (1972), decided several years before Epting. In this case 
the Utah Supreme Court held that a state road supervisor's decision 
to use berms as a sole means of warning highway travelers that 
a road was closed and should not be traveled was not a basic 
policy decision essential to the realization or accomplishment 
of some basic governmental policy, program or objective and 
was thus not immune. In arriving at this decision, the court 
adopted a policy level operational ministerial level analysis. 
The court states: 
The principle is that although basic policy 
decisions are allowed immunity, this exception 
is not extended to the ministerial implementation 
of that basic policy. 
Id. 
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Thu-, this Court must assume that the court in Kpt in j was 
appl yin< iinaJ ybJ.j pt w i ous J y adopted in Carroll , and further 
supported in the recent cases of Frank v. The State of Utah, 
613 • . (Utah 198 0) , ,ind L i 11 J e v , U t a 11 State Division 
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (it.. 1983). Furthermore, the 
language in Carroll is supportive of r.nis Court's finding today. 
The court in Carroll states: 
. . . [A] valid consideration in evaluating 
a factual situation was whether there was 
a reason for sovereign immunity, i.e., did 
the employee's decision. , , rise to the 
level of g o v e r n m e n t a l decisions towards 
which judicial restraint should be exercised. 
Id. at 389 
The professional judgment of correctional personnel as 
to the status of prisoners is just the .licy making 
decision toward which judicial, restraint sruula ^e exercised. 
Again, L i i Frank v. State , 6 1 3 P . 2 d 51 ? (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court refi ise< 3 t J ) shiel < 3 1 1 ic state I: rom su i L where 
the plaintiff alleged that the negligence of a state employed 
psychologist resulted ;he suicide of his son, as the court. 
found that the psych - "" !'• W H M > H i \t>\\d\\y d i - onary, 
but ministerial. Nevertheless, I he language of Frank, again 
supports the earlier holding in Epting and this Court's decision. 
T h « • • 
The except ion was intended to shie ld , 
those government acts and decisions impacting 
on l a rge numbers of people in a myriad of 
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unforseeable ways from individual and class 
legal actions the continual threat of which 
would make public administration all but 
impossible. 
Id. at 519-520. 
A removal of the shield of governmental immunity in correctional 
policy making areas would submit the State in a "myriad of unfor-
seeable ways to individual and class legal actions, the continual 
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible." 
In Beal v. Turner, Warden, 22 Utah 2d 418 (1969), the Utah 
court enunciates the policy behind affording discretion in a 
case such as is before the Court today: 
The Board of Pardons and the men in the 
Adult Probation and Parole Department are 
striving in a professional way to rehabilitate 
adjudicated criminals, so that these criminals 
may take their place in a law-abiding society. 
To accomplish this objective, the Board 
of Pardons and the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department must have leeway in taking chances 
and enlarging the ambit of a promising prisoner. 
(Even) when the confidence which they had 
in the parolee is (later) seen to be mis-
placed. . . . 
454 P.2d at 626. 
The plaintiff further claims that analysis of the discretion 
involved in placing defendant Roberts into a halfway house and 
ultimately on home leave does not meet the four part test set 
out in Little, supra, at p.11. This Court disagrees. The decision 
to classify a prisoner by the Department of Corrections, whether 
that decision is made at the Board of Pardons level or by an 
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employee at a halfway house, is a basic policy making decision 
ii :i. wlii 'h i m/r M I ,' JIKJ piogLdJii f actcrs must be analyzed. 
Interference with r ••• discretion involved iii such a decision 
could change the course and direction of the State 1s correctional 
pin .- r - ,. ~ '"• /.. . -.- •• urt- can answer affirmatively the 
four questions posed. Little at p, .1 , 
The most troubling argument made by the plaintiff is that 
the Utah Supreme Court has adopted an analysis of the "discretionary 
function" exception which gives employees exercising discretion 
in the upper echelons of go\ J -^ent i mm ui i i ty f c • r d i sc r e t i onar y 
policy d e c i s i o n s , but denies immunity to bureaucrats ii :i the 
trenches, since they merely perform m i n i s t e r i a l , implementing 
a< ts. The plaintiff .J. ;• for this position in the 
recent cases of Frank v. State, 61 * v * ;A *.i" iijtah 1980), Bigelow 
i . I n g e r s o l l , 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 19 8 0 ) , and Lj/J__ ivision 
of Family Services, ••* . : .' ^ P 1^9^ . An example of 
the language upon which the plaintiff relies is the following 
from Frank; 
In t h i s r e g a r d , t h i s Court has followed 
the lead of cases interpreting the Federal 
Tort Claims Act by distinguishing between 
those decisions occurring at a broad, policy-
making level and those taking place at the 
implementing, "operational" level. In Carroll 
v. State Road Commission, this Court, recognized 
that almost all acts require some degree 
of discretion, and observed that the exception 
to the waiver set forth in the Act should 
be confined to those decisions and acts 
occurring at the "basic policy-making level," 
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and not extended to those acts and decisions 
taking place at the operational level, orf 
in other words, ". . . those which concern 
routine, everyday matters, not requiring 
evaluation of broad policy factors." 
Id. at 520. 
Although this Court admits that the language of the Utah 
Supreme Court confuses the issue between the level at which 
the decision is made and the nature of the decision involved, 
a reference to the cases referred to under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act clarifies this important distinction. The seminal 
case under the Federal Tort Claims Act on discretionary function 
is Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, 
the court discussed at length the discretionary function exception 
of the Federal Tort Claims Act coining the analysis of policy 
versus ministerial. However, the court held that discretionary 
function includes: 
More than initiation of programs and activities 
in that where there is room for policy judgment 
and decision, there is discretion. It neces-
sarily follows that acts of subordinants 
in carrying out the operations of government 
in accordance with official directions cannot 
be actionable. 
Id. at 35-36. 
Some federal court cases following Dalehite narrowly focused 
on the term "policy" and developed a dichotomy analysis for 
determining the applicability of the discretionary function 
exception. These cases drew an imaginary line between upper 
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echelon " \. »1 icy levei" decisionmakers, and lower level "operational" 
employees charged with executing «•• implementing tie policy. 
The plaintiff would claim t^.c t-; -i vh:i < : 1 i t he 
Utial1 Supreme Court has adoptee. .< :;; >upreme Court case 
of United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Area Rio Grandense, 
104 S. 27 55 (1.984) -••-•* « -at the ] eve J oriented analysis 
is nc . a valid interpretation of the discretionary function 
exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Rather, trie Supreme 
Courl. discussed sever.il fdcturs which it recommended to be used 
in determining whether acts of government are protected from 
liability by the discretionary fuoctio: ., %~r ; st 
fact'T discussed by the court effectively prohibits consideration 
of the actor's rank or his hierarchical position within the 
decision making process 11 :i 3etermIni n< I whether the discretioi iary 
function exception applies. The Court states: 
The basic inquiry concerning the application 
of the d i s c r e t i o n a r y function exception 
is whether the challenged acts of a government 
employee, whatever his or her rank, are 
of a nature and quality that congress intended 
to shield from tort liability. 
Id. at 27 6 5 
T I: I i s C ' v v. .
 ; s i s o f e m . i nisteria 1 
versus policy dichotomy to be the better-reasoned, and assumes 
that thi.c - -r " *.iic language cited by the pi ai nt i ff irieai is 
has indicated an in tent ion t o f o11o w the 
federal court's direction under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
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If it is the same broad policy factors which must be considered, 
this Court can see no difference between their consideration 
by the Board of Pardons in determining whether or not someone 
should be placed on parole, and their consideration by the director 
of a halfway house in determining whether or not an inmate should 
be granted work release or home leave. It is the nature of 
the discretionary act, not the level at which it is made which 
should be analyzed. 
Finally, this Court does not believe it leads to the orderly 
administration of justice for a trial court to assume that a 
case which is controlling precedent has been overruled without 
comment by the Supreme Court. If Epting is no longer the law, 
it is the Utah Supreme Court's responsibility to so state. 
The Utah Supreme Court, the U. S. Supreme Court, and numerous 
other state courts have looked to the nature and quality of 
corrections decisions, and have concluded that these decisions 
are the type of acts which were intended to be protected by 
the "discretionary function" exception. Thus, this Court finds 
that the acts complained of by the plaintiff "arise out of the 
exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform 
a discretionary function," and thus that the State of Utah is 
immune from liability. 
Because this Court has found that the "discretionary function" 
exception is applicable, it need not reach the issue of the 
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incarceration exception, ot Liie public duty doctrine as it applies 
to t J: :i€ • S t a t e c £ I Jt .at 1 However , in passing , this Cour t comments 
that the language cited by the defendants from Epting v. State 
would indicate that the conduct complained of wnuhl also be 
covered by the incarceration exception to the Governmental Immunity 
Act :alfway house is an "other place of legal confinement" 
a • " » •. reme Court has held that a \ lospital when-- onr J/. committed 
under a <<"-;i ~rdei* is such a place, Emery v. State, 26 Utah 
2d 1 (1. it iidtic'A :^oje is since the plaintiff's injury 
arose wh- \ • defends Roberts was qrar : temporary home 
leave from this halfway house, whether r. - was still within a 
place OL legal confinement. This court need not decide that 
issue, but believes that it is an issue which needs clarification 
from our Supreme Court. 
The issue of duty - - -^  - • -". i. * , :* 
this opinion dealing WIL.I U*C xi\di id^.n defendants. 
II. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE IN THEIR REP-
RESENTATIVE CAPACITY. 
The U t a h Supreme Cour t i n Mad sen v . Borthick , 658 P . 2 d 
627 (1 11 a I :t ] 9 8 3 ) h a s r e c e i :i 11 y d e c ] a r e d t h a t t h e G o e i: n n i e n t a 1 
Immunity Act is the exclusive remedy against governmental employees, 
and that a government official or employee can only be sued 
i representative capacity in an actioi:t against a governmental 
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entity when that entity itself is liable. Id. at 633. Since 
this Court has found that the State of Utah is not liable as 
it is shielded by governmental immunity, the individual defendants 
in their representative capacity are also shielded by that immunity. 
BJJ THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR 
ACTS OR OMISSIONS CAUSING INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF IF SHE CAN 
ESTABLISH THAT THE EMPLOYEES ACTED OR FAILED TO ACT DUE TO GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD OR MALICE. 
The plaintiff mistakenly quotes pre-1978 cases for the 
proposition that the legislature intended that suits be allowed 
under the Governmental Immunity Acts against State employees 
for their negligence. See, generally, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 
P.2d 925 (Utah 1977); Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1979); Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). However, in 
the Governmental Immunity Act amendments of 1978, the legislature 
added the following provisions on official immunity in Section 
63-30-4: 
The remedy a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y 
or i t s employee for an in ju ry caused by 
an ac t or omission which occurs during the 
performance of such employee 's d u t i e s i s 
af ter the effect ive date of t h i s act exclusive 
of any o ther c i v i l a c t i o n or p r o c e e d i n g 
by reason of the same subject matter against 
the employee or the e s t a t e of the employee 
whose act or omission gave r i s e to the claim, 
un les s the employee acted or fai led to act 
through gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
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As the court clearly held in Madsen v. Borthicky 658 P.2d 
627 (Utah 1983): 
The apparent purpose of these two paragraphs 
is to replace the common law of official 
immunity and its distinction between dis-
cretionary and ministerial acts or omissions 
with a new standard coordinated with the 
standard of governmental immunity established 
in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The court continues: 
The second quoted paragraph of Section 63-30-4 
reaffirms that the employee will not be 
personally liable unless he or she acted 
or failed to act due to gross negligence, 
fraud or malice. The second paragraph also 
a representative capacity in an action against 
the governmental entity, but only where 
the act or omission is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Thus, employees of State entities lose the protection of 
the Act and can be sued in their personal capacity if they act 
or fail to act through gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
The individual defendants disagree with the plaintiff's 
argument that it is an issue of fact for the jury to determine 
whether or not the individual defendants' omissions and acts 
amounted to "gross negligence" within the meaning of the statute. 
The defendants first claim that the 1983 amendment to Section 
63-30-4 of the Act wherein the term "gross negligence" was eliminated 
bars the plaintiff's suit. The effective date of the amendment 
was March 10, 1983. The plaintiff's cause of action arose on 
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December 24, 1982. It is the statute which was in effect at 
the time the plaintiff's cause of action arose which must apply. 
This is reinforced by both statutory and case law in Utah. 
In Section 68-3-3 of Utah Code Ann., it states: 
Revised statutes not retroactive. No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive 
unless expressly so declared. 
There is no such declaration of retroactive application 
in the 1983 amendments. Furthermore in the case of Okland Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974), 
the Utah Supreme Court states: 
It is true, as the employer Okland contends: 
that it is entitled to have its rights determined 
on the basis of the law as it existed at 
the time of the occurrence; and that a later 
statute or amendment should not be applied 
in a retroactive manner to deprive a party 
of his rights or impose greater liability 
upon him. 
Defendants attempt to escape this well accepted principle 
by stating that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue 
until she had filed a proper notice of claim, had waited the 
required period, and could proceed in court under the Act. 
Defendants claim that since the plaintiff's action is created 
by the Act, her cause of action cannot arise until she has complied 
with the conditions of that Act. The problem with this argument 
is that employees are within the ambient of the Act, but not 
when it is alleged that their conduct arises out of gross negligence, 
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malice or fraud. Thus, the Act has no application to the plaintiff's 
claim against these defendants in their personal capacity. 
The defendants next argue that a statute or amendment may 
be applied retroactively if vested or contractual rights are 
not enlarged, eliminated or destroyed, citing State Dept. of 
Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). However, 
this case offers defendants no support as it deals with changes 
in the law strictly procedural, and not affecting substantive 
rights. The court in this case in fact states the well accepted 
principle argued by the plaintiff: 
These authorities state the well established 
rule that statutory enactments which affect 
substantive or vested rights generally operate 
only prospectively. 
Id. at 1000. 
It is difficult to see how the removal of a plaintiff's 
right to sue for "gross negligence" does not take away substantive 
rights. 
Finally, the defendants cite Haddenham v. State, 550 P.2d 
9 (Wash. 1976) for the proposition that abolition by the legislature 
of an accrued cause of action based upon statute does not violate 
any rights of plaintiff, because a tort cause of action is not 
vested until it is reduced to judgment. This case stands for 
no such proposition. Rather, the case holds that statutes normally 
will be construed to operate prospectively only, unless they 
have a remedial effect: 
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. . • . Where, however a statute is remedial, 
and its remedial purpose is furthered by 
retroactive application, the presumption 
favoring perspective application is reversed, 
o . . . Remedial statutes in general afford 
a remedy or better or forward remedies than 
those already existing for the enforcements 
of rights and redress of injuries The 
intent of the Crime Victims Compensation 
Act is to compensate and assist the residents 
of Washington who are innocent victims of 
criminal acts. Its purpose is patently 
remedial. 
Id. at 12. 
Thus, the court allowed retroactive application only because 
it found the statute in question which allowed compensation 
for the victim enlarged the rights of the plaintiff and was 
remedial. The change made by the 1983 amendment certainly is 
not remedial as it eliminates any remedy for the plaintiff. 
Finally, the defendants attempt to persuade this Court 
that the purpose of the 1983 amendment eliminating "gross negligence" 
was simply to clarify the meaning of the earlier enactment. 
This Court finds this a strained argument, as the 1983 statute 
clearly sought to eliminate substantive rights which it had 
previously granted. 
Finally, the defendants argue that even if the 1978 law 
applies, that the facts taken in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff do not state a cause of action for gross negligence. 
The defendants1 argument is based upon common law prior to the 
1978 amendments to the Act, which indicates generally that public 
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employees will not be held responsible if they were acting honestly 
and in good faith within the scope of their authority. However, 
the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear in Madsen v. Borthick, 
supra, that the prior common law with respect to the liability 
of officials is no longer relevant, and that the language of 
the Act applying to employees must control. 
Therefore, taking the term "gross negligence" as somewhere 
between simple negligence and intentional wrong doing, this 
Court is persuaded that the facts alleged by the plaintiff, 
if proven, could be found by a jury to establish "gross negligence." 
C. THE DEFENDANTS OWE A DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Before the individual defendants can be found legally liable 
for the plaintiff's injury, it must be established that there 
is a duty between the parties. Plaintiff cannot recover against 
these defendants if the only duty owed to her was a public or 
general duty. 18 McClelland, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 
Section 53.046 at 165 (Third Ed. 1971). This public duty rule 
has been recognized in Utah. In Obray v. Malmberg , 26 Utah 
2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court declared 
that the failure of a sheriff to investigate, and not actionable 
by an individual, since the public official's duty is to the 
public. Again, in Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 
1984), where two deputy sheriffs were allegedly negligent in 
failing to arrest a motorcyclist they had reason to believe 
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was drunk/ and he was later killed when he failed to negotiate 
a curve, the court refused to find any duty based upon the statutory 
duty of the defendants to preserve the peace and make lawful 
arrests. The court, however, stressed that the individual defendants 
undertook no duty, excepting employment as a police officer, 
a duty owed to the public. The language of the court is instructive: 
Appellants did not allege that the officer 
assured Michael Stout he would take care 
of him, or by his words or conduct induce 
him to rely on the officer's protection. 
Appellants did not allege that the officer 
in any way induced him into a false sense 
of security. In sum, appellants failed 
to allege a common law legal duty owed to 
them by the city and/or the officer. 
Id. at 613. 
Another case which is instructive on duty is the recent 
Supreme Court case of Little v. Utah State Division of Family 
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In this case, as discussed 
infra, the Court found that the Division of Family Services 
had breached a duty when it was alleged that it negligently 
caused the wrongful death of an infant by failing to properly 
evaluate a foster home, and failing to supervise the child's 
placement in the home. Here, the court clearly held that even 
though the Division of Family Services had a duty generally 
to the public, that it also had individualized that duty to 
the plaintiff by affirmatively acting in the area. 
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There is no controlling case authority in Utah as to whether 
the defendants as correctional authorities charged with the 
responsibility to incarcerate, manage, supervise and rehabilitate 
violent and dangerous offenders owe a duty to act reasonably 
to protect the general public from these individuals. The case 
law nationally is split, and this is a new and developing area 
of the law. This Court, since there is no Utah authority directly 
on point, has taken the liberty to examine the authority from 
other jurisdictions, and has determined that the better-reasoned 
cases follow Section 319 of the Restatement of Torts Second, 
which states: 
Duty of those in charge of person having 
dangerous propensities. One who takes charge 
of a third person whom he knows or should 
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to 
others if not controlled is under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to control the 
third person to prevent him from doing harm. 
The difference between this duty and the general no liability 
for public duty in law enforcement situations is well addressed 
by Howard Nelson in his Law Review article entitled, "Victim's 
Suits Against Government Entities and Officials for Reckless 
Release," (Vol. 29: 595, 1980): 
The [publ ic duty] r u l e i s g e n e r a l l y used 
to deny claims a g a i n s t the government for 
f a i l u r e to provide public services designed 
to benef i t the community a t l a rge such as 
p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n . The duty to con t ro l 
the conduct of another based upon the r e l a t i on -
s h i p between t h e p a r t i e s does not a r i s e 
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in cases involving the failure to provide 
services. When a victim is attacked by 
an assailant against whom police protection 
has been refused, there is no duty owed 
to the victim, because there is no relationship 
between the police and the assailant. Further-
more, there is clearly no voluntary assumption 
of a duty by the police when they fail to 
provide protection to a citizen. In release 
situations, however, the government has 
voluntarily assumed the control of an inmate 
by placing him in a detentional facility. 
A duty to the victim arises out of this 
voluntary assumption of custodial responsibility 
by the government. 
This analysis has been adopted by many neighboring states: 
Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 
1977); State v. Silva, 478 P.2d 591 (Nev. 1971); White v. State, 
661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983); Upchurch v. State, 454 P.2d 112 
(Hawaii 1969); Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo. Ct App. , 
1984). The Court finds particularly persuasive the authorities 
cited and the reasoning expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court 
in the recent decision of Cansler v. State of Kansas, 675 P.2d 
57 (Kan. 1984). 
The defendants argue that since governmental immunity is 
alive and well in Utah, that this indicates a legislative intent 
against creating a private cause of action in cases such as 
this. It is true that the legislature has chosen to insulate 
the State and even its negligent employees working in discretionary 
decision making areas such as corrections from liability generally. 
However, the legislature has specifically carved out an area 
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in which it will allow citizens redress (when the employee acts 
with "gross negligence, fraud or malice"). This indicates that 
the legislature would support a private cause of action to deter 
employee conduct of such an egregious nature and to compensate 
an innocent victim who suffers as a result of this conduct. 
Furthermore, the legislature can, has and will continue 
to close areas of liability which it feels are contrary to the 
public interest. In fact, Ms. Prue could not recover if her 
cause of action were to arise today because the legislature 
by amendment in 1983 removed "gross negligence" from the statute. 
Thus, any argument as to the flood of potential liability which 
this Court's holding may create is not persuasive. 
D. THE ISSUES OF BREACH OF DUTY AND FORSEEABILITY ARE 
ISSUES OF FACT WHICH MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. 
Based upon the above-cited authority and the analysis of 
the Court, the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted on the basis of governmental immunity. The Motions 
for Summary Judgment of the individual defendants are denied 
as this Court finds that the plaintiff has stated facts which, 
if proved, could allow a jury to find that the "gross negligence" 
of the individual defendants acting in their personal capacity 
proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. 
The Court directs counsel for the plaintiff to prepare 
an Order in conformance with this Court's Memorandum Decision, 
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submit it to counsel for the defendants, and then to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this &\/ day of August, 1985. 
'//*, m A/M«J/7 i \£TOITH M. BILLI1 
"DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. EMXON HJNr>i V 
N 
\ ) * ^ My' ^ r -
PRUE V. STATE PAGE TWENTY-NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this 21 day of August, 1985: 
George M. Haley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
175 S. Main, 10th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey Weston Shields 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West 300 South, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Allan L. Larson 
Bruce H. Jensen 
Christopher Fuller 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Carlie Christensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
APPENDIX "C 
SHIELDS <fc SHIELDS 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS 
S U m 3 0 3 SHIELDS SUILDIN6 
SA3 EAST FOURTH SOUTH STREET 
BAUT LAXCK crrv. XJTAM M I U 
ISOti 33S-4703 
yfyr iU^Jfc^ 
JED W. SHfELOS 
JEFFREY WESTON 
JAN 12 1983 
ftJPj£JJSTATEOFFICE**" »««u>i 
vP ATTORNEY GENERA£M*,MW 
January 10, 1983 
Office of Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH 
Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE AND CLAIM 
In accordance with the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 163-30-12, 
as amended, you are hereby notlfed that LA DAWN PRUE, by and through 
her attorneys, SHIELDS & SHIELDS, 1s herewith making claim for 
InjjuHes she received on December 22, 1982 and/or December 23, 1982, 
when she was shot twice with a .357 caliber gun by an Individual 
released from the Utah State Prison, allegedly to a "halfway house" 
facility. 
Said LA DAWN PRUE 1s eighteen years of age and as a direct and 
proximate cause of the above-captloned events, claimant has teen 
rendered a parapaleglc for the remainder of her life which has been 
predicted to be of normal length. 
Said LA DAWN PRUE alleges that the State of Utah was negligent 
and/or grossly negligent 1n allowing the release of the Individual 
who shot her out of prison and that the State of Utah had knowledge, 
or should have known, that said Individual harbored dangerous and 
violent propensities and was not a fit candidate for Incorporation 
Into society, and that the State of Utah has therefore fallen below 
its duty to protect the claimant from known dangerous felons, all 
proximately resulting 1n her present severe Injuries. Claimant 
further alleges that the acts of the State of Utah as above set forth 
resulted In the deprivation of her civil rights as defined by Title 
42, United States Code, S1983 and the United States Constitution. 
LA DAWN PRUE herewith demands monetary compensation in a sum 
reasonable and .proper to compensate her for her debilitated physical 
condition, pain and suffering, fear, loss of future employment oppor-
tunity, medical and surgical expenses presently expended and to be 
expended In the future, loss of present wages and Income and such other 
and further relief as 1s just, equitable and appropriate 1n the premises. 
Office of Attorney General 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE ANO CLAIM 
January 10, 1983 
Psoe 2 
¥ou are further notified that after the passage of ninety (90) 
days or the refusal of the State of Utah to settle the above set 
out claim, said LA DAWH PRUE Intends to commence an action In the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, for relief as demanded above on the grounds set forth above. 
. All correspondence or communication regarding the above matters 
1s to be directed to the following: 
Jeffrey Weston Shields 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS 
243 East Fourth South 
Suite 303, Shields i6ii1ld1ng 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-4703 
nease ywcni yourselves accordingly. 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS 
APPENDIX "D" 
George M. Haley 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Je f frey Weston Shie lds 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS 
243 East Fourth South 
Sui te 303, Shields Building 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-4703 
Attorneys for Claimant 
—oooOooo--
LaDAWN PRUE, 
-vs-
Claimant, 
STATE OF UTAH, WILLIAM MILLIKEN, 
personally and as Director of the 
UTAH STATE DIVISION OF 
CORRECTIONS, THE UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, 
OGDEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
CENTER, JOHN DOES 1-10 and ABC 
AGENCY 1-10, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
AND INTENT TO SUE 
•oooOooo 
Comes now the claimantf LaDawn Prue, by and through her 
counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, of Shields & Shields, and George 
M. Haley, of Kipp and Christian, P.C., and pursuant to U.C.A. 63-
30-1, et seq.f (1953, as Amended), hereby file and amend the 
required Notice of Claim filed by the Claimant on January 10, 
1983, as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Claimant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
2. On or about December 22, 1982, the claimant, LaDawn 
Prue, was shot twice by Kenneth Roberts in front of her home for 
no apparent reason. 
3. As a direct and proximate cause of Kenneth Roberts 
action, the claimant has been rendered a paraplegic for the 
remainder of her life due to the fact that her spinal cord was 
severed by the gunshot wounds. Due to her disability, claimant 
is unemployable, requires present and future medical expenses, is 
suffering from ongoing pain and mental distress and loss of body 
function. 
4. Claimant is informed and believes that prior to the 
time of Kenneth Roberts' release from Utah State Prison, he was 
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incarcerated for a number of violent and aggravated criminal acts 
in the "A" Block of the Utah State Prison, a secure area of the 
medium security area of the prison reseerved for dangerous or 
problem inmates. 
5. Upon information and belief, the claimant alleges 
that the State of Utah, by and through their agents, William 
Milliken, Director of the Utah State Division of Corrections, and 
others, were cognizant of Kenneth Roberts1 dangerous and violent 
propensities* 
6. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
Kenneth Roberts communicated to the Board of Pardons, prior to 
his release, that he felt he was not a fit candidate for release 
and could not handle the outside world. 
7. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
in August of 1982, the Board of Pardons denied Kenneth Roberts 
parole and determined that he would not be reviewed for parole 
prior to August of 1983. 
8. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
Kenneth Roberts1 criminal record and psychological profile indic-
ate that he was not a reasonable or fit person for parole, or for 
release into the general public, or for release to the Ogden 
Community Corrections Center. 
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9. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
in spite of the foregoing, William Milliken acting in his 
capacity as Director of the Division of Corrections authorized 
and ordered the release of Kenneth Roberts to the Ogden Community 
Center Halfway House, knowing that said halfway house would be 
closed for Christmas and that Kenneth Roberts would be released 
from the halfway house to the public at large. 
10. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
defendant Milliken did not follow the guidelines established by 
the Board of Pardons, the Division of Correction, and the State 
of Utah, in releasing an inmate from the Utah State Prison, and 
that the defendant Milliken released Kenneth Roberts from the 
Utah State Prison on his signature alone, and that defendant 
Milliken failed to have his decision to release Kenneth Roberts 
reviewed by the Screening Committee of the Board of Pardons, and 
failed to comply with other requirements for release of inmates 
established by the Board of Pardons, the Division of Corrections, 
the Department of Social Services and the State of Utah. 
11. Upon information and belief, the claimant alleges 
that once Kenneth Roberts was released from the Utah State 
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Prison, that the State of Utah oy and tnrougn tne Board of Par-
dons and the Board of Adult Probation and Parole failed to super-
vise adequately Kenneth Roberts once he had left their custody 
and control. 
12. As a result of the State defendants1 conduct in 
releasing Kenneth Roberts into the public at large, Kenneth 
Roberts was able to affect the attack on the claimant and inflict 
the injuries and damages to the complaint complained of herein. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Claimant references and incorporates within allega-
tions of Paragraphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations 
contained above. 
2. That William Milliken and other unidentified State 
employees, herein referred to as John Does I through III, were 
negligent, willful, wanton, reckless and grossly negligent in 
releasing Kenneth Roberts from the Utah State Prison. 
3. As a direct and proximate cause of Kenneth Roberts' 
release, claimant sustained grievous personal injuries, past and 
future medical expenses in an amount subsequently to be determin-
ed, disfiguring permanent injuries, was rendered paraplegic 
losing the use of her legs permanently, suffered psychological 
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nd emotional trauma requiring past and future professional 
herapy, suffered loss of body functions and requires specialized 
quipment and care* 
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of 
tah# the named agencies and the named individuals in the amount 
f $4.3 Million. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Claimant references and incorporates within Para-
raphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1 
hrough 3 of the First Claim for Relief as though fully set forth 
erein. 
2. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
,he defendant William Milliken, acting in his capacity of the 
lirector of the Division of Corrections, failed to comply with 
,he established guidelines and criteria for release of prisoners 
:rom the Utah State Prison. That had the established guidelines 
leen followed, Kenneth Roberts would not have been released from 
.he Utah State Prison. 
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3. The actions of the Utah State Division of Correc-
tions and William Milliken, in failing to comply with the estab-
lished criteria and guidelines for release of prisoners, proxi-
mately caused the injuries sustained by claimant, resulting from 
the attack upon her by Kenneth Roberts. 
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of 
Utah, the named agencies and the named individuals specified 
herein in the amount of $4.3 Million. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Claimant references and incorporates within Para-
graphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1 
through 3 of the First Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1 through 
3 of the Second Claim for Relief, as though fully set forth 
herein. 
2. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
the individuals and agencies specified herein had actual know-
ledge of the violent, dangerous propensities of the Kenneth 
Roberts. 
3. In spite of said knowledge, the individuals and 
agencies herein*,named authorized the release of Kenneth Roberts 
without complying with the established guidelines, requirements 
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and procedures. Further, that in spite of their knowledge as to 
the dangerous propensities of the Kenneth Roberts, they failed to 
supervise or oversee Kenneth Roberts once he was released from 
the care and custody of the Utah State Prison and the Ogden 
Community Correction Center Halfway House. 
4. As a direct and proximate result of the State 
defendants1 failure to supervise Kenneth Roberts once he was 
released, the claimant was attacked by the defendant Roberts and 
sustained the injuries complained of herein. 
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the named 
agencies, State of Utah, and individual defendants specified 
herein, in the amount of $4.3 Million. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Claimant references and incorporates herein Para-
graphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations, Paragraphs 1 
through 3 of claimant's First Claim for Relief, Paragraphs 1 
through 3 of claimant's Second Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1 
through 4 of claimant's Third Claim for Relief, as though fully 
set forth herein. 
2. The State of Utah, acting by and through its agent 
William MilliKen, and other agents whose identity is, as yet, 
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unknown to claimant, knowingly and willfully paroled and/or 
released Kenneth Roberts from the Utah State Prison with a reck-
less disregard for life and safety of the claimant, as well as 
other members of the public. 
3. Said willful and wanton conduct constitutes gross 
negligence, and directly and proximately caused the unprovoked, 
violent, heinous, and destructive attack upon the claimant, 
resulting in the injuries referred to above. 
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery against the named 
agencies, named individuals and the State of Utah in the amount 
of $4.3 Million. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Claimant references and incorporates within Para-
graphs 1 through 12 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 1 
through 3 of the First Claim for Relief, Paragraphs 1 through 3 
of the Second Claim for Relief, Paragraphs 1 through 4 of the 
Third Claim for Relief and Paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Fourth 
Claim for Relief, as though fully set forth herein. 
2. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
the defendant William Milliken, and other employees of the State 
of Utah, yet to be identified, arranged to have Kenneth Roberts 
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released from the Utah State Prison to the Ogden Community Cor-
rection Center Halfway House* 
3. The defendants, Milliken, and unidentified State 
employees, made this arrangement knowing that the halfway house 
was about to close for the Christmas Holidays and that Kenneth 
Roberts would, therefore, not be at a halfway house and would be 
released from the halfway house into the public at large. 
4. Upon information and belief, claimant alleges that 
the individual State employees arranged to have Kenneth Roberts 
released from the Utah State Prison to the halfway house as a 
subterfuge to release him from the prison prior to the date 
established by the Utah State Board of Pardons in August of 1983. 
5. That the actions of defendants Milliken and other 
as yet unidentified State employees, were outside the scope of 
the Governmental Immunity Act contained in 63-30-10 U.C.A. (as 
Amended, 1953); and as a direct and proximate result of the 
individual State employees9 actions in enabling Kenneth Roberts 
to be released to the public at large, the claimant suffered the 
injuries complained of herein. 
WHEREFORE, claimant seeks recovery from the State of 
Utah, the Utah State Department of Social Services, William 
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Milliken, State employees John Does I through III, in the amount 
of $4.3 Million. 
DATED this Q day of March, 1983. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
SHIELDS 6 SHIELDS 
JEFE#gy'v\!Eij,rUN SHIELDS 
AVOJjfneys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Respondents 
Brief by mailing four copies to George M. Haley of Haley & Stole-
barger, Attorneys for Appellant, Tenth Floor Walker Center, 175 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and one copy to 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, co-counsel for Appellant, at 50 South Main 
Street, Suite 2001, Post Office Box 30815, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84130, this 2nd day of September, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^^hxiszj6j^l\er^C. Vuller 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
